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MAINTENANCE OF MARKET STRATEGIES IN
FUTURES BROKER INSOLVENCIES: FUTURES
POSITION TRANSFERS FROM TROUBLED FIRMS
ANDREA M. CORCORAN
and
SUSAN C. ERVIN*

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, banks, pension funds, and other large institutional investors
acting as money managers for the savings of small public customers are
entering the nation's futures markets. As a result, commodity brokers, or
futures commission merchants (FCMs),' are becoming substantial fimancial
intermediaries. On the average, an FCM today holds more than $36 million
in customer funds, over four times the 1980 figure.2 Although FCM failures
and resulting bankruptcies remain unusual events and the federal regulatory
and industry self-regulatory protections against such events have increased
substantially in the past decade, even the potential for customer loss and
market disruption stemming from an FCM failure underscores the need for
effective responses to a broker insolvency. In their absence, the resulting losses
are likely to be viewed as the disastrous privations of uninformed pensioners
little able to bear them rather than a foreseeable consequence of poor credit
* Ms. Corcoran is the Director, and Ms. Ervin is the Chief Counsel, of the Division
of Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Washington, D.C. The
Commodity Futures Trading views herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the Division of Trading and
Markets.
1. The Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) et seq., the federal regulatory
framework for commodity futures trading in the United States, defines "futures commission
merchant" to include "individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged
in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection with
such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends
credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or
may result therefrom." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
2. See Division of Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Follow-up Report on Financial Oversight of Stock Index Futures Markets During October
1987 at Appendix I (Jan. 6, 1988); Commodity Account Protection, A Study by the Division
of Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission at 32-33 (July, 1985) (1985
figures); National Futures Association, Customer Account Protection Study at 37 (Nov. 20,
1986). As the Division of Trading and Markets Commodity Account Protection study points
out, institutional traders such as banks, pension plans, registered investment companies,
commodity pools, mutual funds and insurance companies represent vehicles for participation
in the futures markets by large numbers of individual public customers. Commodity Account
Protection at 15.
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decisions by sophisticated, informed institutions participating in complex mar3
kets.
Commodity brokers are currently subject to direct federal regulation under
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA or Act)4 and regulations promuigated
thereunder, 5 as well as supervision by industry self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) that are subject to federal oversight. In 1974, Congress established the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) as the
successor to the Commodity Exchange Authority under the Department of
Agriculture and vested it with exclusive jurisdiction over commodity futures
and options trading in the United States. 6 The CFTC administers and enforces
the provisions of the CEA and related regulations, which include requirements
for registration of FCMs7 and other commodity professionals,' compliance by
FCMs and other CFTC registrants who handle customer funds with minimum
financial requirements established by the CFTC, 9 segregation of and separate
accounting for customer funds by FCMs, 10 maintenance of adequate books
and records,11 specified risk disclosures to customers,' 2 and supervision of
customer accounts and personnel handling such accounts. 3 In addition to the
CFTC's authority to administer and enforce these and other regulatory requirements directly, the CEA contemplates the exercise of substantial selfregulatory responsibilities by each designated contract market (exchange) and
registered futures association. 4 Each SRO is required to maintain an affirmative action program to assure the integrity of the markets it supervises, the
financial viability of its members, and the safety of customer funds.' 5
3. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points, or 23
percent, the largest single drop in history, following a drop of 236 points, or 9.5 percent, the
prior week. This market event further emphasizes the points made in this article, including
the importance of the isolation of risk at a defaulting firm, clearing firms' continued support
of open positions notwithstanding individual customer defaults, and the daily mark-to-market
and settlement process which limits counterparty risk in the futures markets.
4. The Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1982).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 1 et seq. (1987).
6. Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 463, 88 Stat. 1399 (1974).
7. Section 4d(1) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(l) (1982).
8. Sections 4k, 41, and 4m of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6k, 61 and 6m (1982).
9. Section 4f(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6f(2) (1982). CFTC Rule 1.17, 17 C.F.R. §
1.17 (1987), specifies the minimum capital required to be maintained by FCMs and provides
a method for calculating an FCM's available capital. Each "contract market," that is, CFTCdesignated exchange, must maintain and enforce financial rules that are no less stringent than
the minimum capital requirements established by the CFTC's regulations. 17 C.F.R. § 1.52
(1987).
10. Section 4d(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982).
11. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.35 (1987).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1987).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1987).
14. "Contract markets" are exchanges authorized or "designated" by the CFTC for the
trading of specific futures contracts. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 7 (1982). The National Futures Association
(NFA) is currently the only registered futures association.
15. Under the CEA and Commission regulations, SROs must maintain, inter alia,
"affirmative action" programs to assure compliance with applicable CEA provisions, Commission regulations and contract market bylaws, rules and regulations. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(8),
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In the event that despite such regulatory and self-regulatory programs an
FCM failure nonetheless occurs, another commodity-related statutory framework, Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,' 6 enacted in 1978
to address problems unique to commodity broker 17 failures, may be applicable.
Although these bankruptcy provisions are designed to minimize customer losses
and market dislocations caused by broker insolvencies, they have been in place
for only ten years and, given the futures industry's record of relatively
infrequent insolvencies, have seldom been called into operation. In the absence
of substantial historical experience testing the efficacy of regulatory and selfregulatory responses to commodity broker insolvencies, the consequences of
commodity broker failures remain uncertain. Recent developments, however,
including the March 1985 failure of Volume Investors Corporation (Volume),
a registered FCM and a clearing member of the Commodity Exchange, Inc.
(COMEX), increasing participation in the futures markets by professionally
managed funds, such as pension and mutual funds, and public concern over
market volatility and the effects of "informationless" technical trading programs, have sharpened public interest in the potential customer and market
impacts of commodity broker insolvencies. Such concerns, in the context of
increasingly interdependent markets, suggest the importance of dispelling uncertainty concerning the consequences of broken failures and the efficacy of
the regulatory and self-regulatory responses to such events, uncertainty which
may adversely affect the otherwise proven regulatory system for futures and
futures options.
This article examines one broker's failure, that of Volume Investors
Corporation, as an illustration of certain customer and market protection
problems which can be engendered by a commodity broker's failure, assesses
current regulatory protections against such problems, and suggests potential
improvements to the system. This analysis suggests that although a foolproof
regulatory shield against the effects of a commodity broker's failure may be
impossible to construct, a systematic approach toward achieving the two
principal goals of any meaningful regulatory response, customer protection
and market integrity, may be both possible and practicable. As protection of
the customers of the failed firm and protection of the overall market against

7a(9), 21(p), 21(q). The minimum elements of such programs are addressed in Commission
Regulation 1.51, 17 C.F.R. § 1.51 (1987). See also Division of Trading and Markets, "Guideline

No. 2," 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 6430 (May 13, 1975) (staff explanation of Regulation
1.51 requirements). SROs must also adopt and enforce rules prescribing minimum financial
and related reporting requirements for their members who are registered FCMs no less stringent
than those applicable under CFTC regulations and must adequately enforce such rules, as set
forth in Regulation 1.52, 17 C.F.R. § 1.52. Specific requirements for SRO financial oversight
programs are summarized in the Division of Trading and Markets' Financial and Segregation
Interpretation 4-1. 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 7114A (July 29, 1985).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766, enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
17. The Bankruptcy Cbde defines "commodity broker" to include an FCM, foreign
FCM, clearing organization, leverage transaction merchant and commodity option dealer with
respect to which there is a customer, as defined in Section 761(9). 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1982).
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the "domino" or "ripple" effects of a firm failure may not necessarily be
inconsistent goals, approaches that maximize customer protection without
diminishing market stability should be explored.
Part I of this article reviews the factual circumstances of Volume's default
and subsequent receivership, the impact of those events upon the individual
customers of the firm and the marketplace as a whole, and significant
regulatory issues raised by those events. In Part II, this article addresses
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and CFTC regulations that respond to the
unique problems presented by commodity broker bankruptcies. This section
focuses upon the two principal purposes of the relevant Bankruptcy Code
provisions, protection of the customers of an insolvent FCM and maintenance
of the integrity of the overall market in the face of an FCM failure, and
the statutory and regulatory measures intended to advance those purposes. This section also analyzes the likely efficacy of the Code's treatment
of the transfer of open futures positions of an insolvent FCM to solvent
FCMs as a vehicle for both customer and market protection, by preserving
the essential hedging and risk reduction functions of the commodity futures
markets and reducing market disruptions resulting from an FCM failure. Part
III considers the Volume episode in light of these Bankruptcy Code policies,
concluding that while the Code's paramount purposes were substantially
achieved, the goal of transferring positions was not, a result that reflects that
in the current self-regulatory context the recovery of account equity over time
is far more readily achievable than maintaining the continuity of open contractual positions. Part IV discusses the potential practical benefits of position
transfers for commodity customers and other market participants and the
difficulties in achieving them and suggests measures that could be taken to
increase the likelihood that transfers of positions from insolvent to solvent
FCMs will occur in the future. These suggestions reflect the view that if the
costs and benefits of a program to effect position transfers on a systematic
basis were carefully assessed, the futures industry could well conclude that a
modestly funded program would not only assist a failed firm's customers but
also would yield significant economic benefits for the exchange marketplace
as a whole, by reducing clearing risk and preserving market strategies of
importance to futures market participants, however sophisticated.
I.

THE

DEFAULT AND RECEIVERSHIP OF VOLUME INVESTORS CORPORATION

A.

THE EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND LIQUIDATION

On March 20, 1985, Volume Investors Corporation, a clearing member

of the COMEX and of several other clearing organizations, defaulted on a
margin call from the COMEX Clearing Association (COMEX Clearing) reported at in excess of fourteen million dollars."' At the time of its default,

18. See G. Szala, "How COMEX Firm's Failure Is Shaking Up The Industry." FuTUREs,
June 1985 at 68.
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Volume had more than one hundred customer accounts. 19 The firm's default

apparently arose from the coincidence of the accumulation by three related
Volume customers, who were also floor traders on the COMEX, of extraordinarily large and, indeed, allegedly illegal, uncovered short call gold option
positions and an unprecedented movement in the price of gold.2° According
to an administrative enforcement complaint filed by the CFTC following
Volume's default, the three floor trader-customers, James Paruch, Gerald

Westheimer and Valerie Westheimer, traded their Volume accounts under
common control and/or pursuant to an express or implied agreement or

understanding. 2' As a result, their positions were allegedly required to be
aggregated for purposes of compliance with exchange position limits and the
CEA. 23 At that time, COMEX had adopted a speculative position limit of
4,000 options for short call gold option positions24 By March 18, 1985, the
Westheimers and Paruch reportedly held among them a total of approximately

12,000 uncovered short call options on gold futures contracts, three times the
permissible concentration of positions if those accounts were in fact under
common control.

19. First Report of Receiver 21 (April 10, 1985), CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No.
85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
20. On March 18 and 19, 1985, international gold markets experienced a sharp price
surge. COMEX spot gold, which had closed at $295 per ounce on Friday, March 15, rose to
$303 per ounce on Monday, March 18, and to $339 per ounce on Tuesday, March 19. These
price increases, which have been attributed to crisis conditions in the Ohio savings and loan
industry caused by the failure of ESM Government Securities, Inc., contrasted sharply with
gold price movements in the preceding several months as well as with general price trends in
prior years. Spot gold futures had generally traded in relatively small price increments within
a range of $290 and $310 per ounce from January 1983 though mid-March, 1985, with a dip
to $281 in February. Since early 1983, the price of gold had generally trended downward. See
generally Volume Investors Corporation, Report of the Division of Trading and Markets,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (July 1985) at 10-11; Kerwin, Let My Money Go:
Customers are Trapped by a COMEX Broker's Failure, BARRON's (April 1, 1985) at 13.
21. Complaint 14, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985).
22. COMEX Rules 4.46(a)(2) and 4.47(a)Ci) and (b).
23. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(5) (1982); Complaint
14-17, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC
Docket No. 85-25 (1985).
24. Complaint 13, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985); COMEX
Rule 4.47(a)(iH) and resolution fixing gold option position limits adopted pursuant thereto.
25. See Wohl v. Westheimer, 610 F. Supp. 52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Volume Investors
Corporation, supra note 20, at 6-7. If the Westheimer and Paruch positions were, as the
CFTC's complaint contends, under common control or traded pursuant to an express or
implied agreement or understanding, aggregation of the three traders' positions was required.
See supra notes 22 and 23. The CFTC's complaint charged the Westheimers and Paruch with
holding positions in violation of Section 4a(5) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6a(5), which renders
it unlawful for any person to violate any bylaw, rule, regulation or resolution of a contract
market fixing position limits. The CFTC's complaint also charged Volume and its principals
with violation of CFTC Regulation 166.3, 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1987), which requires diligent
supervision by each Commission registrant of the handling of commodity accounts and all
other activities relating to its business as a Commission registrant, in failing to bring the
Westheimer and Paruch accounts into compliance with applicable COMEX position limits.
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On March 18 and 19, 1985, spot month gold prices rose by more than

$44 per ounce on the COMEX, including a $36 price rise on March 19 alone,
the largest one-day percentage price rise ever recorded in gold. 26 This price

rise dramatically increased the previously de minimis margin required to
sustain the option positions written by the Westheimers and Paruch, 27 reflecting the operation of the daily mark-to-market system in the futures industry

by which profits and losses are calculated and payable on a daily basis and
28
the movement of those formerly out-of-the-money positions into the money.

On March 19, 1985, Volume made margin demands upon the three

customers totalling approximately twenty-six million dollars. 29 Because the
Westheimers and Paruch were unable to meet these margin demands,10 Volume

was in turn unable to satisfy an original margin call reported at approximately
fourteen million dollars, 3' an amount which exceeded the firm's own assets,

23-26, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985). See
Complaint at
CFTC v. Commodity Fluctuations Systems, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd
without opinion (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1986). In addition, the CFTC's complaint alleged that
COMEX breached its duty under Section 5a(8) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8), to enforce its
rules and regulations, by, among other things, failing to enforce its position limits in respect
of the Westheimer and Paruch accounts. Complaint 44 49-62, In re Volume Investors Corp.,
CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985); see infra note 54. The CFTC's administrative claims against
COMEX, Volume, Volume's principals, and related charges against COMEX Clearing have
been settled. The case remains pending against the Westheimers and Paruch.
26. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 10-11; Wohl, 610 F. Supp. at 53;
H.J. Maidenberg, Concern Over Safety of Funds, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at D2. The oneday March 19 price move of 11.9 percent and two-day price move of 14.9 percent on March
18 and 19 are relatively modest when compared to the 23 percent price move on the Dow
Industrial Average on October 19, 1987.
27. See Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 8.
28. Losses on open positions are collected in the form of variation margin payments
payable on a daily basis. These payments are made to the clearing organization, which in turn
pays them on a daily basis to the clearing firms on-the opposite side of the market whose
positions correspondingly have profited. Clearing organizations also generally have authority
to issue intra-day margin demands as warranted by market conditions. See, e.g., Board of
Trade Clearing Corporation Bylaw 603. By contrast, original margin deposits are required to
be deposited by clearing firms with the clearing organization when a position is established,
typically by the morning of the business day following the transaction. Although original
margin requirements are generally applied uniformly, clearing organizations may call for "super
margins" that reflect unusual market risks of particular firms. See Bankruptcy Act Revision:
Hearingson H. R. 31 and 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2377, 2379-82 (1977) (testimony of
William T. Bagley, former Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman) [hereinafter
"Bagley Testimony"]; T. Russo, REGULATION OF nato COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS
MARKETS at §§ 2.03-2.04 (1983). By COMEX Clearing rule, option margin mark-to-market
payments must be held at the clearing organization and are not, as a practical matter, passed
to the other side of the market as are similar futures payments, and thus are not characterized
as variation margin by the exchange. See COMEX Clearing Rule 45.
29. Verified Complaint at 4 17-18, Wohl, 610 F. Supp. at 56; Westheimer v. Commodity
Exchange, Inc., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,571 at 33,491
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
30. Id.
31. Szala, supra note 18 at 68.
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issued by COMEX Clearing and payable the morning of March 20, 1985.12
Volume consequently defaulted to COMEX Clearing.3 3 The clearing margin
demand which Volume failed to meet was primarily based on losses on
Volume's large net short position in gold options, which in turn principally
reflected the Westheimer and Paruch positions.34 On the following day, March
21, 1985, COMEX Clearing issued two new margin calls to Volume, one for
original margin with respect to options positions and one for variation margin
36
35
on its futures positions. Volume was unable to meet either call.
As the omnibus exchange counterparty, the clearing organization guarantees that the parties on the profitable side of a transaction will receive the.ir
profit and that the parties on the losing side will pay their losses. 37 Thus, in
the event of a clearing firm default, the clearing organization must answer
for the firm's margin obligations to the clearing firms on the opposite side of
the market. Consequently, following Volume's failure to satisfy COMEX
Clearing's margin calls, COMEX Clearing itself, as the "buyer to every seller"
and the "seller to every buyer," became immediately obligated to satisfy
Volume's obligations to the counterparties to Volume's transactions. To pay
the other side of the market for the losses on Volume's customer positions
on the COMEX, COMEX Clearing drew upon: (1) the full amount of the
original clearing margin deposits of Volume in respect of open customer
positions ($9,800,000); (2) Volume's proprietary account at COMEX Clearing
($661,395); and (3) Volume's contribution to the COMEX Clearing guarantee
fund ($29,787.35).3" Volume's original margin account at COMEX Clearing
represented deposits by all Volume customers, including not only the three

32. Wohl, 610 F. Supp. at 53.
33. Id.; Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 19.
34. Wohl, 610 F. Supp. at 53; Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 19.
35. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 25.
36. Id. at 25-26.
37. All futures contracts made on a commodity futures exchange are submitted for
clearance to a clearing organization that matches the purchase and sale sides of each futures
transaction prior to accepting the trade for clearance. When the clearing organization accepts
a trade for clearance, it becomes substituted as the principal party to each side of the contract,
becoming "the seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller." As the counterparty to
every futures transaction, the clearing organization guarantees the performance of each trade
accepted for clearance. See 1 P. JOHNSON, CoMoDrrEs REGULATION § 2.50 (1982). In practice,
in most instances this guarantee applies to the net position of a clearing member; the clearing
member itself guarantees payments between its customers with offsetting positions. T. Russo,
REGULATION OF THE ComoDrms FUTURES AND OP'IONS MARKETS, § 2.06 (1983). The clearing
organization guarantee comes into operation if a clearing member firm is unable to satisfy
demands for variation margin, representing losses on its open positions, issued by the clearing
organization, which in turn must make corresponding variation margin payments to clearing
member firms holding profitable open positions. Id. In such a case, the clearing firm's default
does not result in a default to the clearing firms on the opposite side of that firm's open
contracts because the clearing organization guarantee assures the uninterrupted payment of
variation margin to the clearing firms owed such payments. See T. Russo, REGULATION OF
THE CO iuioDrrms FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS (1983) §§ 2.01-2.09; 1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITEs REGULATION § 2.50 (1982).
38. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20 at 27.
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defaulting traders but also all nondefaulting customers. 39 COMEX Clearing's

action, therefore, affected customers of Volume generally, including customers
who did not have positions at COMEX, by depleting funds available at
Volume to pay customer equity claims based on futures and commodity

options positions irrespective of the contract market where the claim aroseA0

To the extent that the large Westheimer and Paruch positions remained

open after their default, adverse price movements would result in additional
margin demands which neither those customers nor, as a consequence, Volume
could satisfy. As the guarantor of losses generated by those positions, 4'
COMEX Clearing, therefore, stood at risk, interposed between Volume and

the counterparties to its positions for as long as those positions remained
open. 42 In addition, although the firm's nondefaulting customers could be
expected to meet margin demands incurred on their own positions and issued
in the ordinary course of business, it is questionable whether such customers

would, if fully informed, respond to margin demands issued by a firm known
to be insolvent. Consequently, COMEX Clearing theoretically could sustain
at least short-term losses generated by all open positions at the defaulting
finn. 43 Similarly, Volume's customers would bear the aggregate risk of adverse
price movements affecting customer as well as proprietary positions overall

because such losses would diminish the assets ultimately available for distribution in a bankruptcy or receivership proceeding.
Despite the risks created by the firm's open positions, beginning on March
20, 1985, Volume's customers apparently were unable, as a general matter, to
liquidate or otherwise to control the disposition of even their own positions.

Certain of the firm's customers, however, were allegedly given favored treat-

39. Id. Volume also subsequently failed to pay a variation margin call issued on March
22 that reflected the previous day's trading. As COMEX Clearing had employed all available
funds that were attributable to Volume in satisfying the variation call of the previous day, it
drew upon its own resources to satisfy this demand, employing an advance from its operating
surplus. Id. at 31.
40. See Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 22; cf. H.J. Maidenberg,
Brokerage Fall Hurts 'Innocents, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1985, at D14 (funds of customers
who opened accounts at Volume to hedge crop purchases in Chicago Board of Trade grain
and soybean futures were frozen by COMEX Clearing); see CFTC Interpretative Letter No.
85-4, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,505 (Division of Trading
and Markets, Feb. 28, 1985) (segregated funds subject to pro rata allocation, regardless of
location).
41. See supra note 37.
42. In the event the financial viability of the clearing organization were itself jeopardized,
the continued existence of the positions would pose a different issue. As the clearing organization merely passes losses from losers to gainers on a zero sum basis and has no independent
stake in the positions, as long as margin payments sufficient to cover losses are made to the
clearing association or are coverable by the clearing organization guarantee, the transfer of
such payments to collecting firms should be automatic. If, however, such losses cannot be
paid by the obligated clearing firm or by the clearing organization, an argument can be made
that the open positions at that point cannot continue to exist.
43. To the extent that COMEX Clearing sustained such losses, it would be entitled to
seek recovery from available assets of the firm in a later bankruptcy or receivership proceeding.
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ment. Some floor trader customers allegedly succeeded in effecting trades
designed to reduce the equity in their Volume accounts before the firm's
membership and trading privileges were effectively suspended. 4 Further, the
CFTC's administrative complaint in the Volume Investors litigation charges
that early on March 20, 1985, a principal of Volume and one of its employees

advised certain Volume customers to transfer their open positions and margin
funds from the firm. 45 According to the CFTC's complaint, as a result of this
advice and with the assistance of Volume employees, transactions were effected

that resulted in the transfer of approximately $3.9 million from one Volume
account alone. 6 The CFTC's complaint alleges that such advice was not

afforded all Volume customers 47 and that such selective advice to transfer
positions and funds violates Section 4b of the CEA,4" which proscribes
fraudulent conduct in connection with transactions in futures contracts. 49 If
accurate, these allegations suggest that uninformed customers may have suffered the worst of both effects of an insolvency: their accounts were frozen
while insiders privy to special relationships with the exchange or the firm

effected transfers that potentially diminished the pool of assets available for
distribution. 0
On March 21, 1985, the CFTC filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Volume
44. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 23.
45. Complaint
35-39, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985).
46. Id. at 37.
47. Id. at 38.
48. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
49. Complaint 39, In re Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985). In
other Volume-related litigation, a Volume customer that allegedly was not timely advised of
Volume's financial difficulties. Flo-Arb Partners (Flo-Arb), contends that it contacted Volume
on March 20, 1985 to request that its account be transferred but was advised that it was too
late to effect such transfers as COMEX had frozen the firm's assets and accounts. Complaint
49-53, Flo-Arb Partners v. Volume Investors Corporation, No. 85 Civ. 3562 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Flo-Arb contends, however, that Volume's accounts were not in fact frozen until a
receiver was appointed for Volume on March 21, that at least two customers of Volume who
subsequently sought transfers of their accounts were permitted to do so, and that transactions
made by Volume continued to be cleared through COMEX Clearing until mid-day on March
21. Id. Flo-Arb alleges that it was, at all times, "prepared to take any action necessary to
accomplish the transfer of its positions to another clearing member, including, without
limitation, the posting of additional cash margin." Id. at 52.
Apparent self-help measures by certain Volume customers who were COMEX members
also are detailed in the CFTC's staff report on the Volume episode. According to that account,
during trading on March 20, certain floor trader-customers opened new accounts or reactivated
accounts with other FCMs. They then conducted trades and assigned those with losses to be
cleared through Volume and those with gains to other FCMs. In effect, these traders received
a beneficial transfer of their Volume account equity without seeking a formal transfer.
According to the Division of Trading and Markets' report, trading records indicate that such
techniques were employed by at least seven Volume customers on March 20. Volume Investors
Corporation, supra note 20, at 23. The CFTC's staff report observes that these transactions
do not "appear to be improper from the trader's perspective" but could have been refused
by Volume. Id. at n.23.
50. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 23.
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was in violation of applicable minimum capital and segregation of funds
requirements under the CEA and CFTC regulations. 5' This complaint sought
appointment of a receiver and injunctive relief.52 The same morning, the court
issued an order enjoining Volume against further violations of minimum
capital and segregation requirements and appointing a receiver to, inter alia,
take immediate possession and control of the firm's assets, supervise the firm,
and assure that no further trades were conducted by Volume except to liquidate
open customer positions or to secure a transfer of Volume's customer equity
and open positions to another FCM. 3
Also on March 21, the COMEX and COMEX Clearing took action to
declare Volume in default and to suspend Volume's clearing membershipY 4
Although after the close of trading on March 20, the COMEX Board of
Governors had adopted a resolution which "ordered, instructed, and directed"
Volume to liquidate the Westheimer and Paruch positions in an orderly manner
and not to accept or execute transactions for other accounts except to liquidate
existing positions, that action would not take practical effect until the opening
of trading on March 21. 55 Shortly before 9:00 a.m. on March 21, COMEX
President Alan Brody announced from the COMEX floor that Volume had
been suspended.5 6 Following a COMEX Clearing Board of Directors meeting,
between 10:45 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. on March 21, notices were distributed to
traders on the COMEX floor stating that Volume had been "suspended,"
that its open futures and option positions would be liquidated by COMEX
Clearing, that no trades could be submitted for clearance through Volume
after 12:00 noon "except liquidating trades specifically authorized by the
Clearing Association," and that trades executed by floor brokers to be cleared
through Volume would only be accepted if executed prior to 11:45 a.m. that
57
morning and presented for clearance before 12:00 noon.
According to COMEX Clearing, it determined not to commence an
organized liquidation of Volume's positions on March 21 because, due to the

51. Complaint, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corporation, No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
52. Id.

53. Order of Preliminary Injunction and Order Appointing Receiver, CFTC v. Volume
Investors Corporation, No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
54. The CFTC's administrative complaint charged both COMEX and COMEX Clearing
with failing to enforce their own rules, in violation of Sections 5a(8) and 5a(9) of the CEA,
7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(8) and 7a(9), in that Volume was allegedly in default and unable to meet
COMEX Clearings minimum financial requirements for clearing members by no later than
11:00 a.m. on March 20, 1985 but was not declared in default at that time nor was liquidation
commenced until at least 11:45 a.m. on March 21, 1985. Complaint
40-48, In re Volume
Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985).
55. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 24, 58.
56. Id. at 26, 62. In COMEX's version of the facts, because of a malfunctioning public
address system, Volume's suspension was apparently not effectively communicated to COMEX
traders. See id. and Affidavit of Edmund R. Schroeder in Support of Motion to Allow in
Part and Disallow in Part the Claims of Daniel L. Shak and Nicholas Caricato 6, CFTC v.
Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
57. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 27-28.
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morning's trading, it allegedly could not calculate the firm's remaining net
positions. 8 COMEX Clearing, however, had apparently decided upon and

assumed responsibility for the liquidation of Volume's positions, subject to
the liability of customers for losses in their accounts, at the time of the
COMEX Clearing Board action reflected in the notices distributed on the
COMEX floor that morning.59 Volume's receiver reported that when he arrived
at Volume's premises on the morning of March 21, 1985, he learned that

COMEX Clearing had suspended Volume as a clearing member and "had
taken over the liquidation of all Volume's positions (including positions carried
by Volume for its customers) on the COMEX."' 6 COMEX Clearing's determination to liquidate apparently rested upon the conclusion that it was "not

practical" to attempt to transfer customer positions from Volume to other
FCMs because Volume had insufficient funds to transfer as margin for those
positions. 61 According to the CFTC staff report on Volume, during the
afternoon of March 21 COMEX Clearing began making arrangements for the
6
liquidation of Volume's accounts through selected brokers. 1
It was not, however, until March 22, 1985 that COMEX Clearing actually
commenced the liquidation of Volume's open positions.6 3 Trades submitted
for clearance after noon on March 21, 1985 and trades effected on and after
March 22 to liquidate the net open positions carried by Volume for its

customers were assigned to a single omnibus Volume liquidation account.Y

According to information developed in the CFTC's staff report as well as
allegations by certain Volume customers, the principal broker in charge of
liquidating Volume's positions was not aware of the nature of individual
customer positions comprising the account but instead was given the net

Volume position in each contract and expiration for liquidation at the best
possible price.6" COMEX Clearing rules, however, seem to contemplate that

58. Id. at 29; Comment Letter from COMEX Clearing to CFTC Re: Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Need for Regulations Addressing Default Situations, November 4,
1985 (hereinafter, "COMEX Clearing Comment") at 6.
59. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 29. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. First Report of Receiver 8, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
61. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 29. COMEX Clearing By-Law
6.1(f)(iv) provides that if the clearing member whose clearing privileges are terminated is an
FCM, the clearing organization shall endeavor to transfer the open contracts of the FCM's
customers to one or more other clearing members in lieu of closing them out.
62. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 29.
63. Id. at 31; Receiver's Application for an Order Authorizing a Partial and Interim
Distribution 6, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
64. Receiver's Application for an Order Authorizing a Partial and Interim Distribution
5-9, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
65. See Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 31; Receiver's Application for
an Order Authorizing a Partial and Interim Distribution, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp.,
NO. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Letter from John S. Kinzey to Eileen Berkman,
CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Affidavit of John L.
Wyer in Support of Motion to Allow in Part and Disallow in Part the Claims of Daniel L.
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the clearing organization would assume the clearing firm's responsibility to
liquidate positions on behalf of individual customers, or at least to assign
liquidation prices that reflected individual positions with, for example, separate

treatment for straddle positions. 66 According to claims by certain Volume

customers, the result of failing to differentiate straddle and other complex

positions in the liquidation process was that in some instances the manner of
liquidating positions itself caused customer losses because the legs of conver-

sions, reverse conversions and other theoretically risk-free positions were
liquidated at different times and without regard to the composition of the

overall position. 67 The liquidation of Volume's positions was completed on
March 27, 1985, and net equity claims of customers were calculated based on
average prices received for positions liquidated. 61
During and following the liquidation of Volume's market positions,

exchange and clearing association officials, together with Volume's receiver,
sought to develop a plan for compensation of Volume's customers. 69 As of
March 25, when the bulk of Volume's positions had been liquidated, it
appeared that approximately $18 million was owed Volume's nondefaulting
customers, against which Volume had available approximately $11.5 million

in segregated funds and $3 million in firm capital, leaving a shortfall of
approximately $3.5 million. 70 At this time the receivership also had claims

against Volume customers whose accounts were in deficit totalling approximately $16 million, $14 million of which was attributable to the Westheimer

and Paruch accounts. 7' In addition to Volume's customers, the other principal claimant against Volume's assets was COMEX Clearing, which had

Shak and Nicholas Caricato, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("[w]hen [COMEX Clearing] liquidates a clearing member's open positions, it does not know
the positions of any individual customers of the clearing member").
66. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 32; COMEX Clearing By-Law
6.1(g). But see COMEX Clearing Comment, supra note 58, at 6-7 (a clearing organization has
no knowledge of individual positions of customers of an FCM and has no obligations to such
customers except to the extent set forth in rules adopted pursuant to the Commission's
bankruptcy regulations).
67. See Objections of Flo-Arb Partners to Receiver's Disallowance of Its Claims, CFTC
v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
68. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 30-35; First Report of Receiver
8-9,
9; Receiver's Application for an Order Authorizing a Partial and Interim Distribution
CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Certain Volume customers
claim that the use of average prices that did not reflect the relationships between legs of
straddle positions violated COMEX Clearing rules and improperly diminished the valuation of
their recoverable account equity. E.g., Objection of Daniel L. Shak to Receiver's Application
for an Order Determining Certain Creditor Claims, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85
Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
69. First Report of Receiver 20, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 33-36.
70. See, e.g., Volume Investors Corporation,supra note 20, at 33.
71. First Report of Receiver 21, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Complaint, Wohl v. Westheimer, No. 85 Civ. 2230 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Complaint, Wohl v. Flo-Arb Partners, No. 85 Civ. 3662 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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infused in excess of $9 million to make variation margin payments on
behalf of Volume. 72 This $9 million was paid by the clearing organization
in variation margin on open positions carried by Volume, including those
of customers who had not defaulted. Interestingly, as the market reversed
itself, the losses on the Westheimer and Paruch positions would have been
moderated to the extent those positions had not been hedged against future
losses.

73

In October, 1985, pending agreement upon a final settlement with respect
to Volume's customers, Volume's receiver made a couirt-approved partial
distribution to the firm's nondefaulting customers of approximately $7
million from Volume's segregated funds, about one-half of the funds then
available to pay customer claims. 74 A final distribution to Volume's customers was made in February, 1986, pursuant to a settlement agreement among
Volume's receiver, COMEX, COMEX Clearing and Volume principal Charles
Federbush. 75 With this distribution, Volume's customers received the full
balance of their net equity claims. The key feature of the settlement
agreement was a $4.1 million bridge loan by COMEX and Federbush to
the receivership which supplied the shortfall between funds remaining in
Volume's segregated account and the unsatisfied portion of Volume's nondefaulting customer claims. This bridge loan was conditioned upon court
approval of a settlement of the receivership's claims against the Westheimers
and Paruch for not less than $5 million in cash and of the receiver's
agreement to repay COMEX the funds advanced upon approval of the
Westheimer settlement and before making any other distributions, except in
76
payment of certain receivership expenses such as accounting and legal fees.

72. First Report of Receiver 19, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
73. This scenario indicates one useful aspect of price limits, which existed on the Comex
silver future, but not on the related option, at that time. Price limits restrict the amount by
which the price of a commodity may fluctuate up or down before a trading halt is required.
74. A previous settlement agreement pursuant to which Volume principals Charles
Federbush and Owen Morrissey had deposited $4.1 million in escrow had been reached in
August, 1985. This agreement was terminable at the option of Federbush and Morrissey if
releases in favor of Morrissey, Federbush and others in connection with claims arising out of
the Volume default were not obtained from all nondefaulting customers of the firm. In
November, 1985, Morrissey and Federbush withdrew from the agreement based upon the
failure of Volume's customers to execute sufficient releases, but Federbush offered to reinstate
his obligation upon certain conditions. See Receiver's Application For An Order Authorizing
Him to Enter into a Certain Amended and Restated Agreement, to Amend Certain Releases
Held by the Receiver, and to make a Second Distribution, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corp.,
No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
75. Amended and Restated Agreement Relating-to Volume Investors Corporation, dated
as of August 2, 1985, among Charles E. Federbush, Commodity Exchange, Inc., COMEX
Clearing Association, Inc. and John F.X. Peloso, as Receiver for Volume Investors Corp.,
Exhibit I to Order Authorizing the Receiver to Enter Into A Certain Amended and Restated
Agreement, CFTC v. Volume Investors Corporation, No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
76. Id.
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CUSTOMER PROTECTION IssuEs RAISED By Tim VOLUME DEFAULT

The Volume Investors default may be seen as a case in which the
.interests of the firm's customers and of the marketplace as a whole were,
in the largest sense, effectively protected. Indeed, from the perspective of
the marketplace, the most salient fact about Volume's default may well
have been its lack of impact. The clearing organization guarantee operated
effectively, such that the counterparties to Volume's open futures and option
positions, the clearing firms on the opposite side of the market, were
unaffected by that firm's default. The episode thus confirmed the ability
of the clearing system to maintain an unimpeded flow of variation margin
and thereby preserve the financial integrity of a contract market 7 despite
the insolvency and consequent inability of a single clearing firm to continue
to meet its commitments. The assumption by the clearing organization of
counterparty risk is an essential attribute of the exchange markets for
78
commodity futures and options trading in this country.
From the perspective of the nondefaulting customers of the defaulting
firm, however, the Volume experience did not establish, and in fact raised
questions concerning, the efficacy of current legal protections.7 9 Although
Volume's customers were eventually compensated for their losses, this
compensation occurred only after a lengthy period during which their funds
were frozen and depended upon a settlement arrangement negotiated months
after the failure that entailed voluntary action by the COMEX and a Volume
principal to supply an interim source of funds. This outcome also followed
extensive Volume-related litigation which threatened still further delays and
fueled press reports of "finger pointing" and disavowals of responsibility
80
for the firm's losses.
The delay and uncertainty that preceded the compensation of Volume's
nondefaulting customers generated widespread public concern over the scope
of the protections afforded by current law to customers of defaulting clearing
firms, such as Volume, and of insolvent FCMs in general. Despite the
stringent statutory requirement that funds deposited with FCMs be maintained in segregated accounts for the exclusive benefit of the depositing
customer,"' innocent customers had apparently lost money, not through
theft by their FCM or its employees, but from the lack of creditworthiness

77. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 40093 (1976) ("the essence of the integrity of a futures
contract and, hence, of the contract market itself, is the clearing organization which secures
that contract").
79. E.g., Kerwin, supra note 20 at 13; Maidenberg, supra note 40, at D14; O'Dea, The
Guarantee That Wasn't There, INTERMARK-ET, July, 1985 at 38 et seq.
80. E.g., Kerwin, supra note 20, at 32 (quoting New York futures attorney's description
of "a giant circle of fingers pointing at each other," as both COMEX and COMEX Clearing
asserted that customers would receive their funds from Volume; Volume's receiver sought
recovery from the Westheimers and Paruch; and the Westheimers and Paruch sued COMEX
and Volume Investors).
81. CEA § 4(d)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982).
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of other customers and seemingly lawful actions of the clearing organization.
Even if strictly honored, the requirement of segregation of funds apparently
was not a foolproof safeguard. 82 This result contrasted with the previously
widespread assumption that with the benefit of complete compliance with
the CEA's segregation requirements, customers of a bankrupt firm "should
receive 100 cents on the dollar for each dollar claimed, notwithstanding the
bankruptcy of the firm which holds their accounts. 8 3 Had this assumption
proved accurate, Volume's customers need not have suffered significant
harm as a result of the default because transfers of their positions could
have occurred and "[blusiness, albeit through another broker, could proceed
as usual."1'
Consequently, despite the eventual compensation of Volume's customers, the case revived previous contentions that the futures industry could
not provide sufficient security to its customers in the absence of a government-sponsored insurance fund or other industry-wide compensation mechanism similar to that afforded securities customers by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC).15 Although the futures industry has a record
of fewer broker insolvencies and far smaller customer losses than the
securities industry, 6 customer losses have been forestalled and public confidence in the futures markets maintained, in significant measure, by the
voluntary contributions of futures exchanges to the compensation of customers of failed clearing members. Such efforts may not only have partially

82. Kerwin, supra note 20, at 32.
83. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 51. (Response of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Certain Written
Questions Submitted by the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary) (hereinafter, "Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions").
84. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1981) (statement of former CFTC Chairman Philip F. Johnson) (hereinafter "Johnson
Statement")
85. SIPC, a non-profit corporation subject to Securities and Exchange Commission and
Congressional oversight, administers securities firm insolvencies, receiverships and bankruptcies
and maintains an insurance fund which provides reimbursement of customer losses of up to
$500,000 per customer, not more than $100,000 of which may represent satisfaction of claims
based on cash. SIPC's enabling legislation, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), is
"in essence, the public conduit for the insurance of broker-dealer customers," originally funded
by assessments of SIPC members but now principally supported by interest received on
investments in government securities. S. Cheston, Investor Protection Under the SIPA: A
Reassessment and Recommendationsfor Future Change, 19 CoLtNi. J. L. & Soc. PRoas. 69,
72 (1985).
86. See National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 13-36. 114. NFA's analysis reflects
that FCM insolvency losses from 1938 through 1985 totalled less than $I0 million. By contrast,
during the first fourteen years of SIPC's existence, 1971 through 1984, it disbursed an average
of approximately $10 million per year, or a total of approximately $153 million, to securities
customers.
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dispelled the impact of previous insolvencies 87 but also prevented general
88
awareness of the limits of the clearing house guarantee.
During the period following Volume's default and prior to the final
distribution to the firm's customers, it became clear that reliance upon a
record of voluntary industry efforts to achieve customer compensation had
the defect of all ad hoc approaches. Such an approach did not assure
recovery in any given case nor did it eliminate the possibility that futures
customers would be required to fend for themselves following a clearing
firm default or participate in prolonged receivership or bankruptcy proceedings to obtain their share of whatever funds could be marshalled from
an insolvent FCM's assets. In addition, the absence of a pre-established
self-regulatory response to compensation of defaulting clearing firm customers deprived the relevant self-regulatory organizations of the security of a
clear course of action, permitting individual exchange member firms to cavil
over the extent to which the exchange should voluntarily recompense Volume's customers and over potential approaches to follow should it elect to

87. NFA comments that "[allthough [futures] exchanges have not established a formal
response structure like SIPC with a public commitment to compensate customers for insolvency
losses, exchanges historically have volunteered such assistance when an exchange member has
failed." National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 114. NFA's report details the futures
industry's substantial record of providing compensation to the customers of exchange member
firms on a voluntary basis. For example, in the 1969 insolvency of "Q" Commodities Co.,
the exchanges in which the firm held memberships reimbursed its customers in full. In 1982,
the COMEX Clearing Association drew upon a letter of credit held as security to provide
some $2 million to assure full reimbursement of the customers of its clearing member, Southern
States Trading Company, Inc. NFA's report also relates that both the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade maintain trusts which may be used on a discretionary
basis to reimburse customer losses. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 22, 34, 114;
infra note 208.
88. As defined by legal commentators, the clearing organization guarantee actually
protects against member firm defaults only to the extent of assuring payment of variation
margin to clearing member firms with net gains on their positions but "does not remove all
risk of default because the clearing house does not guarantee the obligations of brokers or
traders who are not clearing members." T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE CoMMoDrrEs FUTUREs
AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 2.09 (1983). In the case of Volume, for example, the clearing
organization guarantee did not protect Volume's nondefaulting customers against the consequences of a default by other customers of the firm. The clearing organization guarantee thus
"indirectly benefits all futures traders" but directly benefits only clearing member firms.
Compare SEC/CFTC JurisdictionalIssues and Oversight-Part 1: Hearings on H.R. 5447,
H.R. 5515 and H.R. 6156 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection
and Finance and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 188, 215 (1982) ("[ilf losses occur and the
customer does not pay them, it becomes the obligation of the broker to do so" and "if, for
any reason, the broker cannot pay those debts, the exchange's clearing house must satisfy
them") (CFTC submission, May 20, 1982); SEC/CFTC JurisdictionalIssues and OversightPart 2: Hearings on H.R. 5447, H.R. 5515 and H.R. 6156 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, and the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 327, 345
(due to the clearing organization guarantee, "[n]o one in the futures market need worry about
the creditworthiness of any other participants") (CFTC submission, June 16, 1982).
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do so. 9 The resulting delay and controversy unnecessarily diminished both
the economic and public confidence value of any compensation ultimately
provided.

In addition, the Volume case engendered controversy because of the
apparently unequal treatment of that firm's customers notwithstanding the
egalitarian principles of required bankruptcy dispositions. As discussed

above, following Volume's default, allegations surfaced that some customers
were warned of the impending default and permitted to transfer equity from
the firm, while others were not. 90 Such claims suggest unfairness and, if
substantiated, illegality in that "insiders" or other customers with special
status or access to information may have secured advantageous treatment
to the potential detriment, in the event of a delayed or partial recovery, of
the firm's other customers. To the extent that such self-help and collusive

transfers were allowed to occur unremarked and unremedied, they could
encourage efforts to obtain unfair advantage in future insolvencies and call
into question the general ability of individual public customers to achieve

fair treatment in such cases. Moreover, even if unfounded, charges of
collusion and unequal treatment may impair public perception of the bona
fides of any self-regulatory response to an insolvency and undermine confidence in the integrity of the marketplace generally.
Finally, the Volume episode created controversy because it illustrated
that segregated customer funds were not completely sacrosanct and could

be diminished following a clearing firm default by virtue of the clearing
organization's access to previously deposited clearing margin. 9' In the Vol-

89. See, e.g., O'Dea, supra note 79 at 44-45; Szala, supra note 18 at 64, 68 (quoting
one clearing firm official's comment that volume's nondefaulting customers weren't "innocent
victims" in that they received the benefit of "cheap commissions" available at Volume by
electing that firm over larger, better-capitalized firms). Such disagreements among exchange
members were fueled by initial uncertainty over the actual amount of the firm's customer
losses but persisted even after the relatively small size of the problem became clear.
90. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
91. See Kerwin, supra note 20. The authority of clearing organizations to employ original
margin deposits in a clearing firm's customer account as security for variation margin payments
in the manner described in the text is not, however, unlimited. In an opinion issued after
Volume's default, the CFTC's General Counsel concluded that clearing organization rules and
by-laws authorizing use of customer margin funds to satisfy any margin obligations attributable
to a clearing firm's customer account collectively, without regard to the underlying ownership
interests of individual customers in such funds, generally are not inconsistent with Section
4d(2) of the CEA. CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3, Use of Segregated Funds by
Clearing Organizations Upon Defaults By Member Firms, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,703 (Office of the General Counsel, Aug. 12, 1985). This opinion also
stated, however, that cleating organizations might be precluded from exercising rights afforded by
such rules and by-laws "by reason of.. . knowledge of or participation in a violation of the Act
or other provisions of law that preclude it from obtaining rights to such funds superior to those
of one or more customers of the defaulting clearing member," for example, in circumstances in
which the clearing organization received margin funds with actual knowledge that such funds had
been transferred by the clearing firm in breach of its duty under Section 4d(2) of the CEA to
27-30, In re
segregate and separately account for customer funds. Id. See also Complaint
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ume case, it became apparent that following a clearing firm default on

margin obligations that exceed the available capital of the firm, the clearing
organization, as the representative of the market, and the firm's customers

apparently held conflicting interests and, indeed, potentially adverse claims
to original margin deposits retained by the clearing organization on behalf

of the firm's customers collectively. 92 Had such funds and property been
required to be used or maintained by the clearing organization solely on

behalf of the customer for which they had been deposited rather than the
firm's customers generally, each customer should have recovered his full
account equity from segregated funds. However, the clearing organization
used such funds as security for the payment of Volume's collective customer
margin obligations and hence effectively employed funds attributable to
nondefaulting customers to satisfy obligations of the defaulters. This action
was contended by some to be inconsistent with the intention of the segregation requirements of the CEA. 93 Under these requirements, FCMs are
obligated to maintain for the exclusive benefit of each customer all funds

94
deposited to margin, guarantee, or secure that customer's futures contracts.

To the extent that such segregated funds were deposited at COMEX Clearing
as original margin deposits, however, they ceased to be held exclusively for
the specific benefit of the depositing customer and also served as security
to the clearing organization for the open contracts of Volume customers

considered collectively, a major factor in defraying counterparty risk and
in maintaining market integrity. The clearing organization's authority to use
such funds as security for a clearing firm's collective customer obligations
reflects the fact that the clearing organization is not merely a depository
for essentially fungible margin deposits but has a special status as a clearing

organization. It also reflects that generally the clearing firm alone, and not
its customers, is in contractual privity with the clearing organization. The
legal conclusion, based on the CEA and Commission regulations, that the

Volume Investors Corp., CFTC Docket No. 85-25 (1985) (charging COMEX Clearing with aiding
and abetting violations of Section 4d(2) of the CEA and CFTC Regulations 1.20(a), 1.20(c) and
1.22 by requesting and receiving a margin payment from Volume while "aware of facts that
should have caused it to believe that in order to satisfy this payment, Volume would have to use,
and did use, the money, securities or property of certain customers of Volume to margin the
trades or contracts of customers other than the ones for whom such funds were held").
92. A similar issue would arise in the event of the failure of an originating FCM to
satisfy margin demands arising from an omnibus customer account combining the transactions
of two or more persons and carried by a second FCM in the name of the originating FCM
rather than its individual customers. If the margin demand could not be satisfied by the
originating FCM, the carrying FCM could claim that the omnibus customer account constituted
a single "customer" and that all margin funds deposited in respect of that account could
therefore be drawn upon to satisfy variation margin demands attributable to the account as a
whole. See CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3, Use of Segregated Funds by Clearing
Organizations Upon Defaults by Member Firms, supra note 91, 22, 703 at 30, 986-87.
93. E.g., Kerwin, supra note 20, at 13-14 (quoting statement of a Volume customer that
the clearing organization "really looted the customers' segregated accounts").
94. Section 4d(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982).

19871

MARKET STRATEGIES

segregation requirements applicable to clearing organizations differ from
those that apply to FCMs remains, however, untested. 9s
By drawing on original margin deposits to satisfy Volume's obligations
to the opposite side of the market, COMEX Clearing assured that other
clearing firms and their customers would not be adversely affected by
Volume's failure to the extent that such deposits served as security for the
firm's transactions. 96 The necessary effect of this market-oriented action,
assuming it were proper upon a final finding of the facts at the disposal
of the clearing organization, was to disadvantage, at least temporarily,
Volume's "innocent" customers because of the apparently irresponsible
trading of the firm's three defaulting cust6mers. 97 Because of COMEX

95. The provision of CEA Section 4d(2) specifically applicable to FCMs states that they
shall employ the funds and property of a custorer as "belonging to such customer." In
contrast, the provision of section 4d(2) expressly applicable to clearing organizations, depositories and all other repositories of customer funds precludes the use of monies or property
deposited on behalf of customers "as belonging to the depositing [FCM] or any person other
than the customers of such [FCMI." Section 4d(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982). The
latter provision has been construed to mean that clearing organizations and other persons that
have received 'customer funds from an FCM may treat them as belonging collectively to the
customers on whose behalf they were deposited, without regard to the individual interests of
particular customers in such funds. CFTC Interpretave Statement No. 85-3, Use of Segregated
Funds by Clearing Organizations Upon Default by Member Firms, supra note 91,
22, 703
at 30,987. The CFTC's regulations are consistent with this view. CFTC Regulation 1.20(b), 17
C.F.R. § 1.20(b) (1987), for example, requires clearing organizations to separately account for
and segregate customer funds received from a member of the clearing organization to purchase,
margin, guarantee, secure or settle trades, contracts or options and all money accruing as the
result of such trades, contracts or options "as belonging to such commodity or option
customers" and specifies that clearing organizations shall not use or dispose of such customer
funds "except as belonging to such commodity or option customers." By comparison, CFTC
Regulation 1.22, 17 C.F.R. § 1.22 (1987), which precludes FCMs from using or permitting the
use of "the customer funds of one commodity and/or option customer to purchase, margin,
or settle the trades, contracts, or commodity options of, or to secure or extend the credit of,
any person other than such customer or option customer," refers only to FCMs and thus,
according to the CFTC's staff opinion, "does not govern clearing organizations or other
depositories of customer funds." CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3, Use of Segregated
Funds by Clearing Organizations Upon Defaults by Member Firms, supra note 91, 22, 703
at 30,988. This construction of Section 4d(2) and CFTC segregation regulations has been said
to reflect the fact that "clearing organizations' direct customers are, generally, clearing firms,
not the ultimate 'customers' who entered into the futures contracts and options positions
accepted for clearance by the clearing organization." Id. See Corcoran, Risk-Avoidance
Strategies for Large Market Participants, 19 RE,. oF SEc. AND CoMoDrrms

REG.

173, 174-

75, 178 (Aug. 27, 1986). On the same or similar reasoning, margin funds securing omnibus
accounts at carrying FCMs could be claimed to constitute a single customer account available
to be drawn upon to satisfy all unsatisfied margin demands in respect of that account. Like
clearing organizations, carrying FCMs are likely to disavow contractual privity with the ultimate
customers whose positions they carry. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
96. Of course, to the extent those deposits were supplemented by a clearing guarantee,
clearing members' obligations to support the guarantee function were drawn upon.
97. The effects of the trading activities of the Westheimers and Paruch were apparently
exacerbated by weaknesses in the financial surveillance programs of COMEX and COMEX
Clearing. Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 50-52; Letter from Andrea M.
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Clearing's use of margin deposited to support the clearing function, open
positions of Volume's nondefaulting customers were apparently unsupported
by margin sufficient to permit their transfer to solvent FCMs and consequently were liquidated. 9 The inability to transfer positions meant that
Volume's nondefaulting customers could be expected to be deprived of the
use of their funds pending a bankruptcy or receivership distribution of their
pro rata portion of available customer property and that some customers
could suffer additional losses because of the manner in which their positions
were liquidated or assigned liquidation values. 99
These and other aspects of the Volume Investors default resulted in
examinations of commodity customer account protection by both the CFTC
and, at the CFTC's request, the National Futures Association (NFA). In a
report to Congress mandated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,100 the CFTC previously had determined that conditions
in the commodities markets did not warrant the establishment of an insurance fund and that a customer insurance program similar to that administered by SIPC for the benefit of securities investors would not be costeffective.'," Following Volume's failure, the CFTC's Division of Trading
and Markets took a broader view of customer account insurance and
identified a number of possible compensation mechanisms that included,
but were not limited to, a federally-sponsored insurance corporation such
as SIPC.1°2 Although this CFTC staff study did not recommend establishment of an insurance program, it found that, despite widespread regulatory
improvements in the decade since the CFTC's previous insurance study,
some risks to customer funds and the parties supported thereby remained.
It also found that as the result of changes in the character of the commodities
markets during that period, the potential consequences of such losses could
well have increased. 0 3 The CFTC staff report recommended that NFA be
requested to undertake a further study of the cost-effectiveness of various

Corcoran, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, CFTC to Alan J. Brody and Thomas
O'Hare (April 1, 1985). Depending upon the degree of factual connection between deficiencies
in self-regulatory programs and a clearing firm default, the clearing organization's "priority"
to original customer margin deposits may have implications for its role as a self-regulatory
body as well as that of ultimate guarantor of futures trades accepted for clearance. That is,
the clearing organization may have dual and potentially conflicting functions insofar as it has
the capacity to employ priority rights to original margin deposits to reduce losses for which it
may in part be responsible. See infra note 261.
98. See supra text at 859; Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 29.
99. See supra text at 859-60.
100. Pub. L. No. 463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
101. See Commodity Account Protection, supra note 2, at Appendix A.
102. Commodity Account Protection, supra note 2, at 63. Alternate compensation mechanisms reviewed by the CFTC's Division of Trading and Markets included surety bonding,
fidelity bonding, and the use of clearing organization guarantee funds to create a customer
compensation fund.
103. Id. at 116.
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alternative forms of commodity customer compensation or insurance.' 0°
NFA's "Customer Account Protection Study," issued in November,
1986, in response to the CFTC's request, addresses potential steps "to
reduce the risk of or to remedy an insolvency loss" and "the direct and
indirect costs and benefits of each."'10 5 That study focuses heavily on current
regulatory requirements of a preventive nature, such as segregation of
customer funds and FCM internal controls. While specifically declining to
make policy choices or recommendations, NFA found that an insurance
program would not be cost-effective and stressed the significance of the
"substantial and wide-ranging customer account protections" currently in
place. 1' 6 With respect to insurance, the NFA report commented that the
substantial public commitment to insurance programs in the banking and
securities industries was "born out of the importance of the retail customer
in those sectors" and threats to investor confidence posed by "widespread
failures.' 01 7 NFA observed, however, that in the futures industry "insolvency
loss is a rare occurrence," that futures customers "derive their confidence"
from "the protections afforded by the industry as a whole and the firm
with whom they choose to deal," and that the retail customer, "although
important to the futures industry, is not its lifeblood."'10
Significantly, the NFA study, like the CFTC staff's examination of
commodity account protection, identified alternative approaches to reme-

104. Pursuant to this recommendation, the CFTC subsequently directed its Division of
Trading and Markets to request NFA "to undertake a preliminary study of the cost-effectiveness
of the various alternatives advanced by the Division and other alternatives NFA itself may
develop and report to the Commission whether insurance could play a role in reducing the
impact of financial failures and, if so, what further action may be advisable." National
Futures Association, supra note 2, at 1.
105. Id. at 3.

106. Id. at 121.
107. Id. As banks are depository institutions that are subject to reserve requirements but
are not required to maintain customer deposits in segregated accounts, insurance serves to
prevent a "run" on the bank that places excessive demands upon reserve funds that are not
required to equal the bank's total outstanding obligations to customers. 12 U.S.C. § 461; 12
C.F.R. § 204.1 et seq. No equivalent problems of short-term demand on an FCM should exist
in the usual case because, if statutory segregation requirements are complied with, funds
sufficient to satisfy existing customer claims would at all times be available except, however,
after a customer default exceeding the capacity of the firm to restore the deficit. This is
because an FCM must at all times have sufficient funds to pay all of its obligations to
customers.

108. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 122. Based upon interviews of NFA
members, NFA concluded that even retail participation in the futures markets does not depend
upon a public commitment to account insurance. Id. at 118-20. It would appear, however,
that institutional investors such as mutual or pension funds, which represent groups of
essentially retail investors, could assess the consistency of commodity futures investments with
their fiduciary responsibilities based in part upon the security of those investments in the event
of insolvency. See Corcoran, Risk-Avoidance Strategies for Large Market Participants, 19
Ray. OF SEC. & CoMiMorrms REG., supra note 95, at 175-78. More recently, they might also
seek to assure themselves as to the extent of potential clearing risk, although the liquidity of
a cleared market may be essential to their trading strategies.
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dying the effects of a commodity broker insolvency that are not patterned
after the securities industry's SIPC insurance program. In particular, the
NFA report stressed the potentially substantial benefits that could accrue
from an approach to customer account insurance designed not to compensate
customers for lost funds but "to facilitate transfers of positions from an
insolvent firm to a solvent one.'0 9 According to NFA, such an approach
could significantly benefit the customers of an insolvent firm in addition to
the marketplace as a whole, allowing hedgers to maintain their positions
without exposure to adverse price movements in the cash markets and
facilitating "the continued orderly operation of the futures markets by
eliminating the specter of forced liquidation of positions."" 0 Nonetheless,
as NFA commented, the "key to any such program would be the immediate
While
availability of sufficient funds to accomplish orderly transfers."''
identifying position transfers as a possible objective of a customer protection
program, NFA's report does not specifically assess the relative costs and
benefits of a program designed solely to fund such transfers." 2 Such
potential benefits could include reduced clearing organization liability for
variation margin payments, the elimination of increased basis risk for
hedgers forced to re-establish hedges following a liquidation of their positions, and the enhancement of overall market integrity achieved by protecting
customer positions against forced liquidation." 3
The events of Volume Investors' default and receivership, as well as
the post-Volume insurance studies by the CFTC and NFA, raise questions
concerning the application of current law to protect customer interests
following an FCM insolvency, including the following:
-To what extent do current bankruptcy laws and regulations assure
a fair and efficient recovery by customers and facilitate the
transfer of customer positions in the event of an FCM insolvency?
-To what extent would application of current bankruptcy provisions in receiverships such as that employed to distribute Volume
Investors' assets enhance the protections available to customers
of defaulting clearing firms and to customers in the marketplace
generally?

109. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 8.
110. Id. at 91.
111. Id. at 92 (emphasis in original). The NFA states that in addition to financing, such
a program would require substantial but unspecified revisions in the pro rata distribution
sections of the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations. Id. See infra note 304 and accompanying text
(discussing pro ration adjustments).
112. NFA's report does include an estimate of the annual costs of such a program of
approximately $2.4 million. Id. at 91; see infra note 302.
113. The industry's past willingness to assume financial responsibility for insolvencies
suggests that voluntary measures to facilitate position transfers instead of or in conjunction
with a program to reimburse customer losses might be undertaken. See supra note 87. Possible
measures to facilitate transfers are discussed in the text of this article at pages 908-13.
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-What measures could be taken to increase the likelihood that
positions will be transferred rather than liquidated without diminishing current protections of the clearing system and the
overall market in the event of insolvency or materially burdening
the industry with unnecessary costs or regulatory requirements?
These issues are discussed below.
II.

BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE LIQUIDATION OF
COMMODITY BROKERS

In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978," 4 Congress enacted the first
bankruptcy laws specifically addressed to "the unique problems raised by
commodity broker bankruptcies."'s These new provisions, codified as Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code)," 6 reflect two
paramount legislative objectives: to protect monies of customers deposited
with insolvent commodity brokers and to prevent the potential chain reaction
or "domino" effects of a commodity broker failure. 17 To facilitate customer
protection, these Code provisions accord customer claims the highest priority
against the bankrupt's estate, subject only to claims "attributable to the
administration of customer property." ' s Congress described this policy as
one which "maintains consistency with the Commodity Exchange Act, which
establishes customer protection as a primary objective" and is expected to
"promote customer confidence in commodity markets generally.""19 In
addition, the Code was designed to impose upon the bankruptcy trustee the
duty to endeavor to transfer to another commodity broker or brokers open
customer commodity contracts and supporting margin in order "to insure
that producers who have hedged their production in the commodities market
are allowed the opportunity to preserve their positions."' 20
Congress's second principal objective in enacting the commodity broker
liquidation provisions of the Code was to protect the stability of the futures
markets. The Code provisions formulated to advance this goal reflect

114. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 598, 92 Stat. 2549.
115. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
116. I1 U.S.C. §§ 761-766 (1982). The CFTC had initially proposed enactment of five
separate Bankruptcy Code chapters, to provide separate treatment for FCMs, foreign FCMs,
clearing organizations, leverage transaction merchants, and commodity options dealers, respectively. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1978). Congress instead enacted a
single commodity broker liquidation subchapter. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act's commodity broker liquidation provisions is summarized in White, The Commodity-Related Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 34 Record of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York 262 (1979).
117. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1978).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (1982). A first priority for administrative claims was believed
necessary to assure the availability of professionals willing to administer an estate which could
potentially consist entirely of customer property.
119. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
120. Id. at 107.
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congressional recognition that preserving market stability following a commodity broker's bankruptcy "is more difficult in the commodities markets
than in other markets," because commodity futures and options contracts
are of very limited duration and because the clearing system addresses price
volatility by requiring that gains and losses on open positions be paid in
cash on a daily or intra-day basis in the form of variation margin payments.1 2' Consequently, the necessity to meet contractual obligations is
virtually continuous and "[d]elay by the trustee can result in default in
making the daily variation margin payments, or default on delivery, either
of which could have a ripple effect that disrupts the entire market."' x2
Conversely, "abrupt action by the trustee could seriously disrupt orderly
trading, resulting in substantial losses to the bankrupt, its customers, and
other market participants.' 2 3 Accordingly, the Code "strongly encourages
the immediate transfer of customer accounts from the bankrupt to a solvent
commodity broker" as a means of preserving maximum responsiveness to
daily payment demands and minimizing the possibility of default on margin
24
payments and delivery.
In addition, the Code establishes a policy against recapture by a bankruptcy trustee of margin payments made to clearing organizations or other
commodity brokers. In securing the clearing organization against liability
for margin transferred to clearing firms on the opposite side of the bankrupt's open contracts, the Code in effect grants a priority to the clearing
organization on behalf of customers generally as opposed to those directly
affected by the financial predicament of their carrying firm and assures the
security of futures transactions despite the insolvency and consequent incapacity of one market participant to pay margin owing into the system.

A. TBE

BANKRUPTCY CODE CUSTOMER PRIORTY

The Commodity Exchange Act establishes that all property deposited
with FCMs by commodity customers to margin, guarantee or secure commodity contracts, and all funds that accrue due to such contracts, are
entrusted to the FCM as a fiduciary and, wherever located, remain the
property of the depositing customer. Under CEA Section 4d(2), an FCM
must at all times "treat and deal" with each of its customer's deposits "as
belonging to such customer," separately account for and maintain such
funds in a segregated account and refrain from using such funds or property

121. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). Moreover, in particularly volatile
and, hence, financially perilous markets, calls for intra-day margin to address price changes
occurring within a trading day and for super-margins addressing the capacity of specific
firms to remain in the market may be made. See 1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION
§ 2.50 (1982); The Silver Market of 1979/1980: Actions of the Chicago Board of Trade and
the Commodity Exchange, Inc., Investigative Report of the Division of Trading and Markets,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission at 69, 711-12.
122. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"to margin or guarantee the trades or contracts or to secure or extend the
credit, of any customer or person other than the one for whom the same
are held."'' 2 These statutory protections are denominated "segregation"
requirements and are designed to prevent the creation of competing security
interests in customer funds, to make clear that such funds are not employable
to satisfy the operating costs of the FCM or for any other purpose, to deter
their theft and to reinforce their status as specially protected property of
the depositing customer. To avoid violating the statutory proscription against
the use of one customer's funds to margin the trades of another, whenever
a given customer account falls into deficit, the FCM must replenish that
deficit from its own capital to assure its capability to meet all customer
26
equity claims without using one customer's funds to pay another.
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, these
customer protections of the CEA had no specific counterpart in the bankruptcy laws and the treatment that commodity customers would receive in
the event of an FCM bankruptcy consequently stood "open to speculation.' ' 27 Indeed, it was likely that the preferred regulatory response to the
imminence of a financial crisis (that is, transfers of positions and collection
of augmented margins) could subsequently be undone by a trustee. In the
absence of a specific statutory bankruptcy priority for commodity customers,
the CFTC and its predecessor agency, the Commodity Exchange Authority,
had urged that the bankruptcy courts treat bankrupt FCMs as holding the
funds deposited by their customers to margin commodity positions in
constructive trust.128 Under this approach, the FCM would have no access
to such funds to satisfy its own obligations, and hence its trustee in
bankruptcy as a direct successor in interest, likewise would "ha[ve] no
ownership interest in customers' funds deposited as margin in their accounts."' 29 Further, under this view, to the extent that such funds could be
traced and identified, they would be recoverable by the depositing customer. 0 Although bankruptcy trustees (and bankruptcy courts) generally
had recognized the claims of commodity customers to funds in segregation,
such decisions had lacked a clear rationale and commonly employed a
makeshift extension of traditional trust law or an application of the law

125. Section 4d(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982). Under the CEA, open trade
equity also constitutes a protected customer interest. Disposition of open commodity contracts
other than pursuant to the customer's express or implied consent is a wrong redressible under
Section 4b of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b, the CEA's general antifraud provision, which has been
construed to prohibit, inter alia, breaches of fiduciary duty by FCMs in connection with the
purchase or sale of commodity futures contracts. Sherwood v. Madda Trading Co., [19771980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,401 (CFTC, 1977).
126. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.22 (1987) (an FCM may not use one customer's funds to margin,
guarantee or secure the positions of any other customer); 48 Fed. Reg. 8717 (1983).
127. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2378.
128. Id. at 2392.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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governing the bankruptcies of securities broker/dealers prior to 1938.11' In
the CFTC's view at the time bankruptcy reform was being contemplated in
the 1970s, the most serious deficiency in these ad hoc approaches was that
they lacked a definitive legal theory and had not been endorsed by any
13 2
appellate court.
The treatment accorded customer claims to funds wrongfully diverted
from segregation or otherwise required to be, but not actually in, segregated
accounts was even less satisfactory. Such claims were likely to be rejected
outright, leaving customers without a priority interest in such funds and,
therefore, entitled only to the status of general creditors. The CFTC reported
that "[w]hile trustees in the bankruptcies of futures commission merchants
have generally awarded commodity customers a preference to funds in
segregation, they have not generally granted such customers a preference to
nonsegregated funds, even where such funds are readily traceable back to
customers."' 33 Decisions such as that in In the Matter of Weis Securities,
Inc. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
20,108 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) confirmed the CFTC's concerns. That case addressed, inter alia, the
claims of commodity customers to customer funds held by a debtor, Weis
Securities, Inc., which was being liquidated pursuant to SIPA. The court held
that to the extent that customer funds had actually been maintained in
segregation, the depositing commodity customers were entitled to have their
claims paid pro rata from such segregated funds.I 4 As to any unpaid,
unsegregated balance, however, such claimants constituted only general creditors of the estate. 3 5
The CFTC consequently advocated enactment of a statutory priority
for commodity customers that would extend to all money, securities, property, and open trades traceable to the FCM's customers collectively, with
authority vested in the CFTC to determine, by rule or regulation, which
assets would be deemed traceable to commodity customers.'36 Congress
adopted a somewhat simpler version of the CFTC's formulation of a
37
statutory priority for commodity customers.
As enacted, the Code's definition of "customer property" provides a
basis for assuring that commodity customers receive priority claims that are
coextensive with their ownership interests in funds and property held by the
bankrupt FCM as defined by Section 4d(2) of the CEA. Under the Code,
"customer property" includes "cash, a security, or other property, or

131. Id.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
In re Weis Securities, Inc. at 20,789-90.
Id.
Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2398.

137. As initially proposed by the CFTC, the statutory priorities applicable to FCMs and
other categories of commodity brokers would have been set forth separately. When Congress
elected to combine treatment of all commodity brokers in a single subchapter, it enacted a
single customer priority provision. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761, 766 (1982). See supra note 116.
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proceeds of such cash, security, or property, received, acquired, or held by
or for the account of the debtor from or for the account of a customer."'' 3 8
In addition, the Code identifies a number of specific categories of customer
property, including "property that was unlawfully converted and that is
property of the estate"' 39 and "other property of the debtor that any
applicable law, rule, or regulation requires to be set aside or held for the
benefit of a customer, unless including such property as customer property
would not significantly increase customer property."' 4
These provisions establish that an FCM's improper commingling of
commodity customer funds, whether with its own trading accounts or other
funds, does not deprive customers of priority claims to such funds wherever
they can be found, effectively overturning the result in Weis Securities. In
addition, the Code's customer property definition provides a basis for
reaching other assets of the FCM to restore customer funds missing from
an estate through diversion or other abuse. In this regard, the Code makes
clear that customer property includes assets of the bankrupt FCM to the
extent that available segregated funds are inadequate to satisfy the claims
of public customers without regard to whether such assets were in fact
diverted from the customer segregated account. Since FCMs are obligated
under the CEA and CFTC regulations to cover shortfalls in customer
segregated accounts with their own funds, 14' an FCM's assets constitute
property required to be "held for the benefit of the customer" to the extent
that available segregated funds are insufficient to satisfy customer net equity
claims. This result is confirmed by regulations promulgated by the CFTC
pursuant to its statutory authority to provide by rule or regulation "that
certain cash, securities, other property, or commodity contracts are to be
included in or excluded from customer property or member property."'' 42
Section 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J) of the" Commission's regulations specifies that
customer property includes "cash, securities or other property of the debtor's
estate, including the debtor's trading or operating accounts and commodities
of the debtor held in inventory" to the extent that other enumerated
categories of customer property are "insufficient to satisfy in full all claims
of public customers."'' 43 These regulations assure that difficulties in tracing
customer funds will not unfairly disadvantage customers to the benefit of
the firm's general creditors, establishing by rule a variation on the presumption drawn from English trust law that "where a wrongdoer commingles his own funds in a bank account with those of another person and
thereafter makes withdrawals from that account, the wrongdoer withdrew
his own funds first."'"

138. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10) (1982).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10)(A)(viii) (1982).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10)(A)(ix) (1982).
141. See supra text at 873.
142. 7 U.S.C. § 24(a)(1) (1982).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J) (1987).

144. 46 Fed. Reg. 57535, 57553 (1981). The CFTC's potentially all-inclusive definition of
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In addition to assuring that customers' priority claims reflect their actual
property interests under the CEA, the Code's priority provisions establish
an equitable standard for allocating customer property among the FCM's
customers. Section 766(h) of the Code requires the bankruptcy trustee to
distribute customer property "ratably to customers on the basis and to the
extent of such customers' allowed net equity claims" and "in priority to
all other claims" except claims attributable to the administration of customer
property.' 45 This pro rata distribution requirement establishes a principle of
equal treatment for all customers and effects a proportionate allocation of
any shortfall in customer property available for distribution, a standard
that accords with established law under the CEA, common law trust

customer property has been criticized as one which "somewhat trivializes the concept of
customer property" under the Bankruptcy Code by essentially subjecting all property of the
debtor's estate to the priority claims of public customers despite Bankruptcy Code language
that seems to contemplate that customer claims would be recognized as general creditor claims
to the extent of a shortfall in customer property. See T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE CoMaoDrrms FuruRs AND OPTIONS MARKETS at §§ 18-72 (1983). However, as Congress contemporaneously afforded the CFTC essentially unlimited authority to define the scope of customer
property, its enactment of a statutory provision that apparently contemplates that customer
property could fail to encompass the debtor's entire estate appears to be intended to provide
a residual protection for customers in the event that the CFTC were to exercise its delegated
authority to define customer property to reach less than all available assets. In enacting Code
provisions to govern the liquidation of commodity brokers, Congress expressed the intent only
to provide a 'framework' for broker liquidations which "[d]ue to the germinal state of
regulation of the commodities industry ... does not provide detailed rules to cover every
contingency" and would be supplemented by regulations to be promulgated by the CFTC
pursuant to a delegation of general rulemaking authority. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1978). To date, however, no court has addressed the issue of the effect of the CFTC's
extension of the definition of customer property to inventory and other putatively proprietary
assets of an FCM under circumstances where general creditors would be materially affected.
See Teuting & King, Funds Protections:An Overview of What Happens When a Commodity
Broker Becomes Insolvent, 7 JouRNAj. oF FuTurs MARKETS 93, 99 (Winter 1987). The basis
for that extension is the segregation requirement that an FCM cover customer deficits with its
own funds. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (1982). A customer's pro rata share of available customer property
is calculated in several steps. First, the customer's net equity claim, defined to mean "the
total claim of a customer against the estate of the debtor based on the commodity contracts
held by the debtor for or on behalf of such customer less any indebtedness of the customer
to the debtor," is calculated. 17 C.F.R. § 190.07(b) (1987). The customer's "allowed net
equity," essentially equal to the pro rata share of the assets available to satisfy his net equity
claim, is determined by reference to the "funded balance" of the customer's net equity claim.
A customer's funded balance for each of five classes of accounts is calculated by multiplying
the ratio of the customer's net equity claim, with certain adjustments, to the total net equity
claims for all customers, by the total property allocated for distribution as customer property
to the accounts of that class. The customer's allowed net equity is equal to the aggregate of
the funded balances of the customer's net equity claims for each account class, modified by
certain adjustments specified in CFTC Regulation 190.07(d), 17 C.F.R. § 190.07(d) (1987).
The CFTC's regulations provide for reducing the customer's equity by the value of positions
transferred on behalf of, or specifically identified property returned to, the customer so that
such pre-distribution transfers do not result in a greater than pro rata distribution to specific
customers.
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precepts, and the bankruptcy principle that "equality is equity."'

B.

46

TRANSFR PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

As noted above, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code reflects
congressional recognition that both fundamental purposes of the commodity
broker liquidation provisions, customer protection and market protection,
would be advanced by transfers of the open positions of an insolvent FCM
to solvent firms. The Senate Report describes the trustee's duty to attempt
to transfer customer positions and supporting margin to other brokers as
an initial and primary duty, based upon the overriding importance of
preserving the hedging function of the futures markets:
This requirement is placed upon the trustee to insure that producers
who have hedged their production in the commodities market are
allowed the opportunity to preserve their positions.' 47
Similarly, in advocating the enactment of provisions to facilitate transfers,
the CFTC had stressed that "in order for the hedging mechanism to work,
the integrity of futures contracts must be beyond question, and hedgers
must be able to keep their futures positions open as long as their cash
positions are open and to close out their futures positions as soon as they
close out their cash positions."'' 4 The CFTC also stressed the importance
to the hedging mechanism of "granting statutory recognition to the ability
of the various contract markets to take prompt action to protect the
commodity customers of their member firms by transferring customers'
' 49
open trades and margin funds to other futures commission merchants."'
The Code's framers also viewed position transfers as a key to market
stability in the event of a broker bankruptcy because transfers, by reducing
positions under the control of a trustee, would minimize the potential for
decisions by the trustee to refuse to make daily margin payments or delivery,
events that could have a disruptive effect on the entire marketplace.' 50 The
House Report commented, for example, that because the securities market
is "well established, fluid and generally 'thick,' " the trustee of a bankrupt
stock broker "could reject contractual commitments with little impact on
the market."'' By contrast, in the comparatively "thin" commodity markets, "a similar power in the trustee of an insolvent commodity broker
52
could result in a ripple effect disrupting the entire market."'

146. Southeastern Express Co. v. Robertson, 264 U.S. 541 (1924).
147. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1978). The same reasoning would apply
to hedgers of financial instruments or obligations whose effective rate of return depends on
maintenance of their hedge positions.
148. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2400.
149. Id.at 2404.
150. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
151. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 271-72 (1978).
152. Id.
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1. Bulk Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code and CFTC Regulations
The Code and Commission regulations consequently contemplate essentially immediate efforts by the trustee to effect transfers of all or a portion
of the open positions of the debtor's customers. The principal Code provision, Section 764(b), insulates from the trustee's avoidance power transfers
of commodity contracts and funds or property margining or securing such
contracts made within five days after the order for relief, if the transfer is
approved by the Commission by rule or order, either before or after the
transfer. 53 By rule, the Commission has required that it be notified no later
than the third business day after the order for relief' 54 as to whether a
transfer under Section 764(b) of the Code will be made and has provided
that, if such transfer is not disapproved by the Commission, it may not be
55
avoided by the trustee.
The Code does not expressly require the trustee to attempt to effect
transfers except, as discussed below, in the case of specifically identifiable
contracts to the extent that the value of such contracts does not exceed the
customer's pro rata share of customer property.15 6 The Commission's bankruptcy regulations, however, mandate immediate, affirmative efforts by the
trustee to effect such transfers. Regulation 190.02(e) requires that the trustee
"immediately use its best efforts to effect a transfer" of open customer
contracts and equity no later than the fourth business day following the
order for relief. 57 In general, all customer accounts with open positions
qualify for a bulk transfer, except for accounts which are in deficit. 5 The
regulations generally preclude the transfer of funds or property in respect
of any account eligible for transfer in excess of a customer's estimated pro
rata share, i.e., "if the value of such money, securities or property would
exceed the funded balance of such account" calculated as of the close of
the business day preceding the transfer. 59 In computing a customer's funded
balance, which is the measure of equity that may be transferred, the value
of any property previously transferred is reflected to assure equivalent
treatment to customers as a whole. 60 Although not constrained by the Code
to apply a strictly pro rata approach to bulk transfers, the Commission's'
rules contemplate that "in the interests of equity, any bulk transfer should

153. 11 U.S.C. § 764(b) (1978).
154. "Order for relief" is defined to mean "the filing of the petition in bankruptcy in
a voluntary case and the adjudication of bankruptcy in an involuntary case." 17 C.F.R.
§ 190.01(dd) (1987).
155. 17 C.F.R. §§ 190.02(a)(2), 190.06(g) (1987).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 766(c) (1978).
157. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(e)(1) (1987). The CFTC's regulations provide that clearing
organizations and other self-regulatory organizations may not maintain rules that are inconsistent with the regulations applicable to position transfers. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(a) (1987).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e) (1987).
159. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e)(2) (1987). See supra note 145.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 190.07(b)(4)I(1987); 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981); 48 Fed. Reg. 8732
(1983).
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approximate, to the extent possible, the distribution which would be made
in bankruptcy."61 A strictly pro rata distribution is not, however, a statutory
62
or regulatory prerequisite to insulation of such transfers from avoidance.1
This flexibility is important because it permits expeditious action to be taken
based on estimates, using the shortfall in segregation as a reference point
for assessments of the assets available for transfer on a pro rata basis,
before more complicated calculations of individual net equities can be
made.163

CFTC regulations expressly contemplate partial transfers if all customer
contracts cannot be transferred.'6 Regulation 190.06(f)(3) states that the
Commission will not disapprove such a transfer for "the sole reason that
it was a partial transfer if it would prefer the transfer of accounts, the
liquidation of which could adversely affect the market or the bankrupt
estate."' 65 Commission regulations also expressly provide for the possibility
of the transfer of a portion of a single customer's open commodity contracts
if all such contracts cannot be transferred.'6 Such a transfer "may be
effected by liquidating that portion of the open commodity contracts held
by a customer which represents sufficient equity to permit the transfer of
the remainder."' 167
2.

Transfer of Hedge Positions Under the Code

Reflecting the special importance attributed to hedge positions by the
Code's framers, the Commission's bankruptcy regulations establish a method
for transferring such positions even if a bulk transfer of the debtor's
customer accounts cannot be achieved. Although the Code does not expressly
address the transfer of hedge positions, it makes special provision for the

161. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981).
162. 46 Fed. Reg. 57546 (1981).
163. The ability to effect transfers on the basis of estimates without the necessity for
completing precise calculations of each customer's funded balance may be critical as a practical
matter because of the extremely limited time (as little as one day) that clearing organizations
are likely to allow such positions to remain open before exercising contractual authority to
liquidate them. See 48 Fed. Reg. 8726 (1983); infra text at 899-900; 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1984).
164. In discussing the Code provisions for transfer, the Senate Report recognized that
"[a]lthough it is preferable for all such accounts to be transferred, exigencies may dictate a
partial transfer." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 107 (1978).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(f)(3)(i) (1987).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(f)(3)(ii) (1987). The rule specifies that if any of the contracts to
be transferred as part of a partial transfer are parts of a spread or straddle, "both sides of
such spread or straddle must be transferred or neither side may be transferred." Implementation
of this provision would appear to require the assistance of personnel employed by the debtor
FCM in identifying straddle or spread positions.
167. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(f)(3)(ii) (1987). An election to liquidate a portion of a customer's
contracts to facilitate a transfer of the remainder may, however, create the possibility for
customer claims contesting the trustee's choice of positions for liquidation or transfer. Although
the CFTC's regulations would appear to leave such details in the trustee's discretion, trustees
may be reluctant to expose themselves to the risk of controversies over the procedures employed
in effecting partial transfers.
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disposition of certain "specifically identifiable" property, including commodity contracts, by affording customers a degree of control over the
disposition of such property, while property that is not so categorized rests
in the exclusive control of the bankruptcy trustee subject to judicial review. 68
The Code provides that the trustee "shall return promptly" to a customer
any specifically identifiable security, property, or "commodity contract" or
"shall transfer," on such customer's behalf, such security, property, or
commodity contract to a commodity broker that is not a debtor under Title
11, subject to CFTC rules or regulations and to the extent that the value
of such security, property, or commodity contract does not exceed the
customer's pro rata share of the debtor's estate if such security, property
or commodity contrast were not otherwise returned or transferred. 69 The
Code provides that in the event that the value of a customer's specifically
identifiable property exceeds his pro rata entitlement, the customer may
deposit cash with the trustee equal to the difference between the value of
such specifically identifiable securities, property, or commodity contracts
and his pro rata share of the bankruptcy estate. 70 The trustee shall then
either return such property to the customer or effect its transfer to another
commodity broker, subject to rules or regulations prescribed by the Com171
mission.
Although the Code does not define either "specifically identifiable
property" in general or "specifically identifiable commodity contracts" in
particular, pursuant to statutorily delegated definitional authority'72 the
CFTC has enacted regulations limiting the category of specifically identifiable commodity contracts to properly identified hedge positions.17 This
approach reflects the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history, which suggests
"that special treatment of hedge accounts was particularly intended.' '1 74 The
Commission's definition of the contracts that may be treated as specifically
identifiable also rests upon the practical assessment that while "in general,
commodity contracts have no value or existence independent of the equity
attributable to them," contracts entered into for hedging purposes "have
an intangible value separate and apart from any equity deposited with
respect to them which results from their hedging function."'' 3 The special
value imparted to hedge positions by their risk reduction function in respect
of cash positions in other markets is the basis for the special burdens

168. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 765, 766 (1978).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 766(c) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 766(d) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
171. Id.
172. 7 U.S.C. § 24(a)(2). Pursuant to this delegated power, the CFTC may provide, "with
respect to a commodity broker that is a debtor under Chapter 7 of Title 11 ... by rule or

regulation ... (2) that certain cash, securities, other property, or commodity contracts are to
be specifically identifiable to a particular customer in a specific capacity."
173. 17 C.F.R. § 190.01(kk)(2)(ii) (1987).
174. 48 Fed. Reg. 8726 (1983).
175. 48 Fed. Reg. 8722 (1983).
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imposed upon the bankruptcy trustee in disposing of such contracts. Accordingly, Commission regulations provide that the only open contracts
eligible for treatment as specifically identifiable contracts are bona fide
hedge positions as defined in Regulation 1.3(z) 176 or commodity option
transactions "determined by the contract market to be economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a
commercial enterprise."'' 77 To qualify for treatment as specifically identifiable property, such futures and option positions must be "identified on the
books and records of the debtor as held for the account of a particular
customer" and be held in an account designated as a hedge account in the
78
debtor's records.
Under the CFTC's regulations, such positions are eligible for disposition
by the trustee in accordance with customer instructions, provided that the
customer first deposits cash with the trustee "in an amount equal to the
amount by which the equity to be transferred to margin such contract...
plus a reasonable reserve in the trustee's sole discretion," exceeds the
customer's estimated pro rata share of the bankrupt estate, less the value
of any previously returned property. 79 The CFTC's regulations also condition such transfers on provision by the customer of "adequate security
for the nonrecovery of any overpayments by the trustee,"'' 0 a requirement
that may be satisfied by the trustee's retention of a portion of otherwise
transferable equity or by a legally enforceable agreement to return a percentage of the distribution to the debtor's estate in the event of an overpayment.' 8 '
Within two business days following entry of the order for relief, the
trustee must request customer instructions concerning the transfer or liquidation of specifically identifiable open commodity contracts and afford
notice that contracts for which transfer instructions are not received prior
to the close of business on the fifth business day following entry of the

176. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1987).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 190.01(kk)(2) (1987).

178. Id. Most large institutional users of the future markets, such as pension funds, are
likely to hold positions that would qualify as hedge positions under the CFTC's regulations.
In a recent interpretation of the definition of "hedging" in CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(z) (1987), the Commission clarified the applicability of the definition to certain riskreduction strategies commonly used in portfolio management by institutional investors. 52 Fed.
Reg. 27195 (1987).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(d)(2) (1987). The reserve required to be deposited in the trustee's
discretion would be retained to cover administrative expenses. 46 Fed. Reg. 57555 (1981).
180. Id.
181. In re Incomco, Inc., No. 80-B-11217 (Bankr. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1980), which was
instituted prior to the issuance of the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations, Heritage Commodity
Consultants Inc. (Heritage) was permitted to elect between transfer or liquidation of its
positions. It elected transfer and its positions were transferred with Heritage's estimated
distributive share of the funds available for distribution, after reserving for administrative and
other such expenses, based upon Heritage's agreement to return a portion of such funds in

the event of an overpayment.
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order for relief will be liquidated.'1 2 The CFTC's regulations also afford
the holders of hedge accounts the opportunity to specify at the time their
hedge accounts are opened that they desire such accounts to be liquidated
by the bankruptcy trustee in the event of bankruptcy, obviating the transfer

notice and instruction procedure otherwise required at the time of bankruptcy. 183 Contracts for which instructions have been received but which
within ten business days
have not been transferred must be liquidated
84

following entry of the order for relief.
These provisions supply a framework for protecting the continuity of
open hedge positions that should significantly increase the likelihood that
such positions will not be liquidated unless the owner so directs. They may
enable the holders of hedge positions to transfer them even if the trustee
cannot accomplish a bulk transfer of all or a substantial portion of the

FCM's customer accounts. Moreover, in requiring that the trustee request
instruction from the owners of designated hedge positions concerning their
disposition and the opportunity to supply requisite funds to secure a transfer
of such positions, these provisions permit the hedger to make his own

assessment of the value of the hedge against the cost of abandoning or
reestablishing it. This ability of hedgers under the CFTC's bankruptcy
regulations to instruct against the liquidation of their open positions and
to supply additional funds as necessary to render such transfers practicable
stands in significant contrast to the generally preclusive effect of a segregation shortfall upon the ability to transfer open positions,

85

affording an

individual customer the opportunity to advance funds to facilitate transfer
of a position that would otherwise be undermargined.
C.

PRE-BANKRUPTCY TRANsb1 .s

The Commission's regulations also contemplate that transfers of cus-

tomer positions may occur prior to a bankruptcy filing, on a preventive
182. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(b)(2) (1987).
183. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(d)(1) (1987). CFTC Regulation 190.06(d)(1) states that a
commodity broker "must provide an opportunity for each customer to specify when undertaking
its first hedging contract whether, in the event of bankruptcy, such customer prefers that open
commodity contracts held in a hedging account be liquidated by the trustee without seeking
customer instructions." 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(d)(1) (1987). This provision only creates an
opportunity to elect in favor of liquidation. To the extent that a hedge customer wishes to
preserve the opportunity to elect between liquidation or transfer at the time of bankruptcy,
such customer would not avail himself of the pre-bankruptcy liquidation election of CFTC
Regulation 190.06(d)(1), but whether a transfer opportunity would in fact be realized in the
event of bankruptcy would not be determinable in advance. To the extent that hedge owners
specify when opening their positions that they desire liquidation of such positions in the event
of bankruptcy, they benefit the firm (and its trustee) by simplifying the disposition of those
positions but lose the potential opportunity to maintain those positions through transfers to a
solvent firm unless a bulk transfer is achieved. Id.
184. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(b)(2) (1987) In addition, under the CFTC's regulations, the
trustee is required to issue margin calls with respect to open contracts and may liquidate
accounts which do not maintain requisite margin levels. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(g)(2) (1987).
Accounts which are in deficit must be liquidated. Id.
185. See infra text at 899-900, 905-07.
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basis, when an FCM's capital has become significantly impaired. The
Commission's minimum financial rules require that each FCM that knows
or should know that its adjusted net capital is less than 150 percent of the
minimum fixed by Commission regulation or applicable exchange rule
establishing a higher level notify the Commission and the relevant exchange
of that fact within twenty-four hours.8 6 Further declines in an FCM's
capital require that the FCM take action to transfer all customer accounts.
Under Regulation 1.17(a)(4), an FCM that cannot demonstrate compliance
with applicable minimum financial requirements "must transfer all customer
accounts and immediately cease doing business as a futures commission
merchant until such time as the firm is able to demonstrate such compliance." 7 These provisions are designed to facilitate transfers "before a firm
becomes seriously undersegregated" and thus "to permit ameliorative measures to be taken before customer losses occur."' 88
As previously discussed, 8 9 the authority vested in the CFTC by Section
764(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to insulate from the trustee's avoidance
powers "by rule or order" transfers of commodity contracts and supporting
margin made "before five days after the order for relief' '9 permits pro-

tection of such pre-bankruptcy transfers against attack in an ensuing bankruptcy proceeding. Pursuant to this authority, the CFTC has provided by
rule that pre-bankruptcy transfers made in compliance with Regulation

1.17(a)(4) of the CFTC's minimum financial regulations are not avoidable
by the trustee unless disapproved by the Commission. '9' In affording general
protection for such pre-bankruptcy transfers, the CFTC stressed that the
absence of such a safeguard could diminish the willingness of transferee

186. 17 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1987).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(4) (1987). The regulation states, however, that if the FCM
"immediately demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Commission or the designated selfregulatory organization the ability to achieve compliance, the Commission or the designated
self-regulatory organization may in its discretion allow such registrant up to a maximum of
10 business days in which to achieve compliance without having to transfer accounts and cease
doing business as required above." Id. The Regulation 1.17(a)(4) requirement of cessation of
business is thus qualified by the FCM's opportunity to demonstrate "the ability to achieve
compliance" and should not be viewed as an automatic termination of the firm's business
operations and status as an FCM. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(4) with Koci v. Herbert
Freehling, Trustee of Bengal Trading Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,231 (Bankr. Ct., S.D. Fla. 1981) (trustee's claim that wire transfer of customer
funds should be distributed ratably to all customers in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 766(h)
rejected on the ground that because debtor FCM was not in compliance with CFTC's minimum
capital requirements, it was "automatically prohibited from doing business as a futures
commission merchant," and hence was "precluded by law from accepting and handling [the
depositing customer's] money at the time it was transferred," and the putative customer
therefore could not become a "customer" or his funds become "customer property" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code).
188. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981).
189. See supra text at 878.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 764(b)(1).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(g)(i) (1987).
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firms to accept transfers and thereby undermine a key protection of customers of failing FCMs and of SROs in addressing such failures. As the
"proper functioning of the Commission's minimum financial rules depends
to a great extent on the cooperation of regulated firms," if the Commission
could not insulate such pre-bankruptcy transfers from avoidance as preferences, they could be recalled at a later date, "potentially jeopardizing the
financial stability of the transferee and interfering with the willingness of
firms to accept account transfers."' 92
In proposing general protection for transfers made in compliance with
Regulation 1.17(a)(4), the Commission observed that "[ildeally, any prebankruptcy transfer of assets under the minimum financial rules would
approximate a post-bankruptcy distribution scheme, while avoiding the
litigation and other administrative expenses commonly associated with bankruptcy proceedings." '93 In addition, transfers under Regulation 1.17(a)(4)
may afford substantial practical advantages over those effected in the context
of a bankruptcy or receivership proceeding. As noted above, Regulation
1.17(a)(4) transfers "should occur before a firm becomes seriously
undersegregated"' 194 and, therefore, should avoid the chief obstacle to transfer, the unwillingness of transferee firms to accept undermargined accounts. 95 Moreover, such transfers may be effected without compliance
with the specific time limitations and other requirements applicable in
bankruptcy. Also, the assistance of personnel of the failing firm to facilitate
such transfers may be more readily available outside of a bankruptcy
context, and the CFTC's regulations "provide more flexibility in effecting
protected transfers prior to bankruptcy than thereafter because the Com196
mission desires to give its current safeguards ample opportunity to work."'
Consequently, while the CFTC stated its view that pre-bankruptcy transfers
should "approximate" 1 97 post-bankruptcy distributions, it also noted that
98
Regulation 1.17 "does not require transfers to be made pro rata. 'J
D.

MARKET PROTECTIONs AFFORDED BY THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

As discussed above,' 99 the Bankruptcy Code's commodity broker liquidation provisions reflect Congress's intent to mitigate the dangers to the

192. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981). In addition to fraud, grounds for Commission disapproval
of such transfers could include failure to comply with CFTC Regulation 1.17(a)(4) in that
fewer than all customer accounts were transferred. See 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981); 48 Fed.
Reg. 8733 (1983).
193. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981). Pre-bankruptcy transfers pursuant to CFTC Regulation
1.17(a)(4) hold potential advantages for the FCM as well as for its customers because if all
customer accounts are transferred, the firm will no longer constitute a "commodity broker" under
the Code, as by definition a commodity broker must have a customer, and will thus be eligible
for reorganization under Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5); supra note 17.
194. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981).
195. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2400.
196. 46 Fed. Reg. 57545 (1981).
197. Id.
198. Id. at n.68.
199. See supra text at 872.
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stability of the marketplace posed by commodity broker bankruptcies. The
transfer of futures positions, pursuant to the provisions discussed above,
constituted a key objective of the Code not only because such transfers
would preserve the hedging and consequent risk transfer or insurance
functions of the futures markets but also because such transfers should
support the integrity of the marketplace and of previously undertaken
transactions against the impact of an individual firm failure by reducing
the potential for related defaults in making margin payments and delivery. 2°°
Additionally, position transfers are consistent with the concept of an exchange market, where the obligations and credit risk of the counterparty
are assumed by a clearing organization rather than individual market participants, and assessments of the creditworthiness of individual contractual
20
counterparties should therefore be unnecessary. '
A second critical market safeguard enacted by the Code was a reversal
of previous decisions indicating that margin payments made to a clearing
organization or other commodity broker prior to a bankruptcy filing might
be avoided by a bankruptcy trustee. Protection against recovery of such
margin payments was viewed as imperative by the CFTC because if such
payments could be recaptured by the trustee, the failure of an FCM could
undermine the stability of other brokers and the clearing organization
itself. 20 2 Indeed, the administrative burden alone of retracing and reclaiming
margin previously passed through the clearing system to counterparty clearing firms and their customers could threaten the orderly operation of the
20 3
clearing system.
Liability on the part of a clearing organization for past margin payments, which would not necessarily be recoverable from its transferee
clearing firms, would impose financial demands upon the clearing organization at odds with the essential character of the clearing system as historically constituted and operated. The chief function of the clearing system
is to ensure the integrity of futures contracts accepted for clearance, an
objective accomplished primarily through the daily mark-to-market system
by which the clearing organization, as the omnibus exchange counterparty,
guarantees that the parties on the profitable side of a transaction will receive
24
their profits and that the parties on the losing side will pay their losses. 0
Demands for variation margin payments are issued on a daily and, at times,

200. E.g., S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 107 (1978); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1195,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980).
201. See supra note 37.
202. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2405-06.
203. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 167 (1981) (testimony of Stephen F. Selig) ("If the Trustee of [a major firm that had
become insolvent] tried to go out into the system to recover money paid as margin, then the
whole system would become paralyzed because nobody would know who was entitled to
what.").
204. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2379-82; see supra text at 855.
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an intra-day basis, and must be met in cash within a time frame that may
be as limited as one hour. 205 Clearing organizations operate principally as
conduits for the transfer of variation margin funds, which once distributed
net to zero, among their members pursuant to the daily mark-to-market
system. Original margin is intended as a performance bond against such
payments being made. Clearing organizations are thus not regarded as
2°6
stakeholders and they are not required to maintain independent resources.
Although clearing organizations may be partially secured by original margin
deposits held on behalf of a defaulting firm and its customers, once such
deposits are exhausted, a clearing organization would be obliged to resort
to clearing member guarantee deposits, 2°7 trust funds2 8 and, depending on
the clearing organization, limited or unlimited assessment powers 2°9 with
respect to its members, sources of funds that do not generally contemplate
significant clearing firm losses.2 10 Consequently, if the entitlement of the
clearing organization to clearing margin received prior to insolvency were
successfully contested, a clearing organization could have potential exposure
to return variation margin payments made over a period of weeks or months
prior to a bankruptcy. The financial viability of the clearing organization
and, therefore, of the exchange marketplace as a whole, could then be
211
jeopardized.
These concerns were underscored by the decision in Seligson v. New
York Produce Exchange, in which the trustee in bankruptcy for Ira Haupt

205. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28 at 2379-82.
206. See Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 45-47.
207. See, e.g., CSC Clearing Corporation Rule 216 (providing, inter alia, that each
clearing member shall deposit and maintain in the Guaranty Fund an amount equal to the
lesser of 10 percent of "working capital" or $500,000, and any additional amount the Board
may from time to time prescribe).
208. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange reportedly maintains assets in excess of $30 million
which can be applied to purposes determined at the discretion of its Board of Governors.
(That the trust is discretionarily as opposed to compulsorily committed appears to be a function
of its tax treatment as a grantor trust. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.671-1.678 (1987)). Similarly, the
Chicago Board of Trade maintains an irrevocable trust with assets reported at in excess of $5
million which apparently may be employed at the discretion of the Board of Trustees to supply
funds for the transfer of customer positions or to pay customer insolvency losses. See National
Futures Association, supra note 2, at 114.
209. Compare CSC Clearing Corporation Rule 302 (establishing a formula for calculating
assessments based upon the proportion of contracts cleared for the defaulting clearing member
and establishing a maximum assessment within a given period) with New York Mercantile
Exchange Clearing Rule 9.03(D) (providing that losses to its Guaranty Fund shall be covered
from operating surplus to the extent determined by the Board but that "the balance of such
loss shall be made up by an assessment in equal shares upon each of the Exchange members").
210. Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 45-47.
211. See Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2406. Conversely, to the extent that the
clearing organization could recover variation margin payments previously made to clearing
firms on the opposite side of the market, that action could jeopardize the financial stability
of its transferee firms, which are likely to have transferred any margin payments received from
the clearing organization to their own customers. Response of the CFTC To Certain Written
Questions, supra, note 83 at 45.
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& Co., an FCM, sought to set aside over twelve million dollars in variation
margin payments made on behalf of the firm's customer account to the
New York Produce Exchange Clearing Association during a seven-day period
shortly prior to the bankruptcy filing. Although the extent of the clearing
organization's liability was not fully resolved in that proceeding, the reasoning adopted by the court in denying the clearing organization's motion
for summary judgment indicated that such liability could exist to the extent
that the clearing organization had notice of the debtor's "precarious"
financial position. 2 2 In advocating statutory protection against recovery of
margin payments in the situation presented in Seligson, the CFTC stressed
that a cleafinghouse "by its very nature, must always have knowledge of
the market positions of its clearing members. ' 21 3 Consequently, to the extent
that such knowledge was viewed as undermining the clearinghouse's good
faith in accepting margin payments, the clearing organization "may be
forced into a position where it is the guarantor not only of any variation
margin payments its clearing members might fail to make between their
first such failure and the closing out of their positions, at most a few days,
but also of any payments they make over a much longer period of time,
perhaps over several months. ' 21 4 The CFTC therefore urged enactment of
a statutory provision to protect against reversal in bankruptcy of all variation
and original margin payments made to any clearing organization or commodity broker prior to bankruptcy "unless made in collusion with such
clearinghouse or such futures commission merchant with the intent of
5
21
defrauding other creditors of the bankrupt futures commission merchant."
Responding to the CFTC's concerns, the Code established a policy
against reversal of variation margin payments and other deposits except in
cases of fraud, 2 6 a measure that "facilitates pre-petition transfers and
protects the ordinary course of business in the market. ' 217 The legislative

212. Seligson v. New York Produce Exchange, 394 F. Supp. 125, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In Seligson, the bankruptcy trustee alleged that the margin payments were transferred without
fair consideration at a time when Ira Haupt & Co. was insolvent and therefore constituted
fraudulent transfers under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. Id. In denying the clearing
association's motion for summary judgment, the court held that there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Haupt received fair consideration, a standard requiring that the
consideration have been given in good faith and constitute a fair equivalent for the transfer
such that "the bankrupt's estate is not depleted as a result of the transfer." Id. The court
found that issues of fact existed as to the clearing association's good faith because of evidence
of the association's awareness oi the firm's "precarious position in the market" and because
it was questionable whether considerations such as "the promise of the Association to clear
Haupt's contracts or its forbearance to liquidate Haupt's positions in any way offset the
depletion of the estate caused by the transfer of $12 million in margin." Id.
213. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2406.
214. Id. The CFTC commented that "[e]ven the financial stability of the clearing houses,
with often millions of dollars at their disposal, would be severely threatened by such exposure."
Id.
215. Id.

216. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1978).
217. Id.
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history reflects an intention specifically to overrule Seligson v. New York
Produce Exchange,2 8 and thereby to "protect all margin payments in the
customer-broker-clearinghouse chain" and "substantially reduc[e] the likelihood that the bankruptcy of one customer or broker will lead to the
' 219
bankruptcy of another broker or clearinghouse.
As currently in effect, Section 546(e) of the Code 20 provides that a
trustee may not avoid and recover margin payments and settlement payments
except pursuant to Section 548(a)(1), 221 which provides for recovery of certain
pre-petition fraudulent transfers. Under the latter provision, the trustee may
avoid a transfer made within one year prior to the filing of the petition
that was made by the debtor "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that
such transfer was made . . .indebted ..... " Further, Section 548(d)(2)(B)
makes clear that a commodity broker, including a clearing organization,
that receives a margin payment or settlement payment "takes for value to
the extent of such payment," resolving in favor of the clearing organization
a key issue raised in the Seligson case and providing a further assurance
against the recovery of payments from good faith transferees.22 Thus,
margin payments generally are not voidable as preferences. This result
follows from the preclusion by Section 546(e) of recovery of margin or
settlement payments except pursuant to the fraudulent transfer provision of
Section 548(a)(1) and because such payments would constitute contempo4
raneous exchanges for equivalent value under Section 547(c)(2).2
A third important market protection was added to the Bankruptcy Code
in 1982 to prevent interference with contractual rights of clearing organizations and other commodity brokers to liquidate a bankrupt firm's open
contracts.2 The CFTC had advocated enactment of a provision that would
protect rights to liquidate futures contracts and to receive margin payments

218. S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1978).
219. See 124 CONG. REG. 517,433 at 764-5 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Senator
Mathias) (quoted in 4 CoLmR ON BANKRUPTCY
764.0113] n.9 (15th ed. 1987)).

220. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 546(e), which was previously
designated Section 546(d), was enacted in 1982 to replace the original margin avoidance
provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Section 764(c). 1 A. HERZOG & L. KING, BANKRUPTCY
CODE (Collier Pamphlet Edition 1987) at 373.
221. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
222. Id.
223. The fact that margin payments are deemed to have been made for full consideration
does not, however, protect against reversal of such payments in cases of fraud or collusion,
as provided in Section 548(a)(1), or prevent clearing organizations or FCMs from being held
in breach of the CEA by reason of accepting or paying margin funds in circumstances in
which such action entails participation in or furtherance of unlawful conduct. See supra note
91.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANK-

§§ 546.05, 548.09[2], 764.01[3] (15th ed. 1987).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1982). This provision was incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code

RupTcY

in 1982 by Public Law No. 97-222, "Technical and Substantive Changes in Bankruptcy with
Respect to Securities and Commodities." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 556.01 (15th ed. 1987).
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notwithstanding the Code's provision for an automatic stay of creditors'
remedies z26 and its prohibition against treatment of the bankruptcy of a
customer as an event of default.227 In supporting the enactment of such
protections, the CFTC observed that it was standard business practice for
commodity customer agreements to permit the liquidation of a customer's
positions "where the futures commission merchant maintaining a customer
account believes that a customer may not be able to meet its obligations
without an actual default." 22 Additionally, clearing organization rules commonly provide for suspension or termination of the clearing privileges of a
clearing member, if other remedial measures are not effective, upon specified
events including insolvency or the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and for
the liquidation or transfer of the firm's positions as rapidly as possible
following such suspension or termination.229 According to the CFTC, "it is
standard practice" for such clearing organization rules to be incorporated
in every contract purchased or sold on or subject to the rules of the
exchange; consequently "it would ... be correct to say that the right of
the applicable clearing organization to liquidate a contract upon its member's
insolvency becomes a part of each commodity contract it clears." ' 0

226. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1982); Johnson Statement, supra note 84, at 24.
228. Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 66.
229. Id. at 67. See, e.g., Board of Trade Clearing Corporation By-Law 804 (upon default
Clearing Corporation may cause all open trades with such member to be closed in the open
market); COMEX Clearing By-Law 6.1(f) (upon termination of clearing privileges, all open
contracts to be closed out "as expeditiously as is practicable but not later than the close of
trading on the Exchange on the business day following such termination" unless open contracts
are transferred; if the clearing member is an FCM, COMEX Clearing shall endeavor to transfer
such open contracts in lieu of liquidation).
230. Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 67-68. The
Commission described the right of clearing organizations to liquidate contracts of insolvent
member firms as one that "may be exercised unilaterally without the consent of the customer
for which such contracts are being liquidated." Id. at 69. But see 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(b)(1)
(1987) (no later than two business days after order for relief, trustee must request customer
instructions concerning the transfer or liquidation of specifically identifiable contracts not
required to be liquidated under regulation 190.02(f)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(f)(1) (1987). The
Commission also stressed, however, that "[tihere are some circumstances ... in which the
immediate closing of contracts might not be required or even desirable and the rules of the
clearing organizations which permit liquidations recognize this fact." Response of the CFTC
to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 69. To the extent that the liquidation authority
of clearing organizations is recognized to be "contractual" and is defined as such by Section
556, that authority would appear to be modifiable by contract. However, as a practical matter,
such a result would be unlikely to be achievable by individual clearing firms or their customers.
As between the clearing organization and the clearing firm, by-laws are established by the vote
of the clearing organization's member clearing firms and would not be modifiable by a single
firm. With regard to clearing firm customers, clearing organizations generally disavow contractual privity on the ground that their only "customers" are their clearing member firms.
COMEX Clearing By-Law 6.19(f) provides, for example, that "in no event shall [the clearing
organization], any other Clearing Member, or any director, officer, employee, or agent of the
Corporation or any other Clearing Member" be liable to a defaulting FCM, its customers or
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Enactment of Section 556 of the Code reflected specific concerns that
Section 365(e), which prohibits the termination or modification of executory
contracts by reason of the commencement of a bankruptcy case, could be
construed to preclude enforcement of "close-out" provisions for the liquidation of open market positions (arguably otherwise executory contracts
subject to affirmance) of bankrupt FCMs by clearing organizations or of
open market positions of a bankrupt customer by an FCM until an actual
default on such contracts occurred. 231 The Commission observed that "the
volatility of the commodities market is ordinarily such that to require a
firm to await a default before liquidating open positions could be particularly
damaging. ' 23 2 Not only might millions of dollars be saved by the ability of
a trustee, clearing member, or clearing organization "to close out positions
rapidly in a customer bankruptcy" but prompt liquidation could be imperative "to stabilize the market."' ' 3 Statutory protection of contractual liquidation rights also was sought "to allay concerns that the commodity broker
carrying the positions of a bankrupt customer or firm would have to petition
a court to vacate or modify the automatic stay to allow the broker to close
out ... positions," a requirement that would expose the broker to "the
risk of sustaining substantial losses" before a court order could be ob4
tained.
The CFTC stressed "the special necessity for not restricting the normal
workings of the commodities futures clearing system which will liquidate
open positions if other alternatives do not appear sound.''235 In the Commission's view, "it would be very difficult for the judgment of a court to
be better than that of the clearing organization in determining when contracts
should not be liquidated and ... any court proceedings would inevitably
take time during which there could be a substantial loss to the bankrupt
estate as the result of price changes.''236 Consequently, even "to permit the
appropriateness of a contract's liquidation to be debated before a court is
to risk not only the rapid mooting of the question in the marketplace, but

any other person because its open contracts were not transferred." By-law 515 of the Board
of Trade Clearing Corporation provides that the liability of the Clearing Corporation "shall
be limited to losses resulting from the substitution of the Clearing Corporation upon contracts
between clearing members" and that the Clearing Corporation will not be liable for, inter
alia, "obligations to a customer by a clearing member." In addition, any assumption by
clearing organizations of direct contractual privity with clearing firm customers could be viewed
as jeopardizing the generally accepted authority of clearing organizations to maintain and
employ customer margin funds posted by a clearing firm as a common fund securing the
collective margin obligations of all customers of the depositing firm without regard to the
individual positions or interests of specific customers. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying
text; infra text at 896-901.
231. Johnson Statement, supra note 84, at 24-25.
232. Id. at 25.

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Response of the CFTC To Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 72.
Id. at 72-73.
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also ... significant injury to other market participants. ' '12 7 Moreover, a
court-ordered stay would create the danger that in the event of a price
movement against open positions protected against liquidation, the clearing
organization or FCM would be forced to use its own funds to satisfy
demands for variation margin on those positions.23 8 In extreme cases where
the frozen positions were large and the adverse market movement severe,
the financial stability of the clearing organization itself could be jeopardized,
'2 9
creating a "potential threat to the stability of the entire market.
As enacted, Section 556 provides, in part, that "[t]he contractual right
of a commodity broker ... to cause the liquidation of a commodity
contract" because of conditions of the kind specified in Section 365(e)(1),
as well as the right to variation or maintenance margin payments from a
trustee with respect to open contracts "shall not be stayed, avoided, or
otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this Title or by the order
of a court in any proceeding under this Title." 24° Section 556 also states
that the term "contractual right" includes "a right set forth in a rule or
bylaw of [a] clearing organization or contract market or in a resolution of
'241
the governing board thereof.

237. Id. at 77-78.
238. Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 46-47.
239. Id. at 44-47.
240. 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1982).
241. Id. The Code's specific prohibition in Section 556 against stays or other interference
with contractual rights to liquidate commodity contracts should be compared to the parallel
Code provision with respect to contractual rights to liquidate securities contracts, Section 555
of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986). The latter provision precludes the
stay, avoidance or other interference with the exercise of contractual rights of stockbrokers,
financial institutions or securities clearing agencies to liquidate securities contracts because of
conditions of the kind specified in Section 365(e)(1) "by operation of this Title or by order
of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this Title unless such order is
authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa et seq.) or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission."
(Emphasis added). The ability of SIPC to secure a stay of the exercise of contractual liquidation
rights in respect of securities contracts, in contrast to the across-the-board preclusion of such
stays in respect of futures contracts, reflects fundamental differences in the insolvency frameworks applicable to securities brokers and to commodity brokers. These include the facts, that
SIPC insures securities customer accounts; that, for purposes of SIPC recoveries, net equity
is determined as of the bankruptcy filing date while for futures customers, net equity fluctuates
until all open positions have left the debtor's estate; and that SIPC has general power to
transfer open securities commitments throughout a bankruptcy proceeding whereas "the
transferability of commodity positions becomes impracticable as a matter of law on the fifth
day subsequent to a bankruptcy filing," except in the limited circumstances in which positions
may be transferred pursuant to customer instruction. Response of the CFTC to Certain Written
Questions, supra note 83, at 71-72.
In precluding interference with contractual liquidation rights, the Code affords seemingly
unreviewable discretion to clearing organizations to liquidate open futures contracts, effectively
requiring that a representative of a defaulting firm's customers or of the firm itself secure the
forebearance of the clearing organization from liquidating open positions in order to assure
an opportunity to transfer open futures positions. In promulgating its bankruptcy regulations,
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CUSTOMER PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOLUME DEFAULT

Although Volume Investors was placed in receivership rather than in
bankruptcy,2 2 the Bankruptcy Code provisions formulated to protect customers of an insolvent commodity broker nonetheless should serve as an
appropriate substantive measure of the extent to which the interests of the

firm's customers were effectively protected. 243 As these provisions were

the CFTC observed that "as a practical matter, [it] would not expect a clearing organization
to wait more than one business day before closing out the open positions of an insolvent
commodity broker unless the trustee or customers holding large positions provided sufficient
assurances that variation margin payments would be met or of other security until such time
as a transfer of those positions could be effected." 48 Fed. Reg. 8726 (1983). The exercise of
liquidation authority by clearing organizations may, however, be limited in particular factual
circumstances by reason of the clearing organization's complicity in wrongdoing or its knowledge of facts that could render it chargeable with abetting a wrong by exercising otherwise
lawful authority. See supra note 91.
242. Following the appointment of Volume's receiver, two of the firm's defaulting
customers, Gerald Westheimer and Valerie Westheimer, filed voluntary petitions for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Gerald Westheimer, No. 85 Bkcy. 10479 (1985)
and In re Valerie Westheimer, No. 85 Bkcy. 10480 (1985). Volume's receiver applied to the
receivership court for withdrawal of these matters from the Bankruptcy Court, based upon 28
U.S.C. § 157 (which provides for withdrawal of a bankruptcy proceeding "if the court
determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both Title I1 and other
laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce"),
contending that resolution of the bankruptcy petitions would require consideration of the CEA.
The receiver also applied for dismissal of the bankruptcy petitions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b) on the ground that they were allegedly filed in bad faith to avoid a warrant of
attachment issued against the Westheimers' assets in an action brought against them by the
Volume receiver. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Receiver's Motion for Withdrawal
and Dismissal of the Westheimer's Bankruptcy Cases, Wohl v. Westheimer, 610 F. Supp. 52
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). The receivership court granted the receiver's application. CFTC v. Volume
Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 1985 hearing).
243. Conversely, the extent to which receiverships such as the Volume proceeding depart
from substantive bankruptcy protections and thus fall short of achieving the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code may also reflect on the Code itself as a remedial mechanism designed to
respond to the special problems presented by the bankruptcy of commodity brokers. The
relatively greater incidence of use of receivership proceedings for the liquidation of commodity
brokers over bankruptcy proceedings renders the choice of law to be applied in receiverships
particularly significant. The predominance of receiverships over bankruptcy proceedings in the
liquidation of insolvent commodity brokers may be attributable in part to the absence of
express statutory authority on the part of the CFTC to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in
respect of insolvent commodity brokers. However, when a clearing firm or other FCM fails,
immediate action is necessary to preserve the assets of the firm and to protect its customers'
interests, actions for which the CFTC is generally far better situated than the firm's customers.
In the absence of authority to institute a bankruptcy proceeding, the CFTC's most effective
means of protecting the interests of the customers of a failing firm for which it is impossible
to transfer accounts is likely to be institution of a judicial receivership proceeding that, like a
bankruptcy filing, places the assets of the firm under the protection of a court-appointed
representative with responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the firm and its customers,
thus preventing de facto differential treatment of customers. Such action does not preclude a
bankruptcy filing but affords the receiver an opportunity to assess the available assets and
claims and determine whether a bankruptcy filing would best serve the interests of the firm's
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formulated specifically to address the unique problems posed by commodity
broker insolvencies, the Code's commodity broker liquidation provisions
would appear to supply the most relevant legal standards for receiverships
that operate to liquidate an FCM's business, at least as to distributional
issues such as the priority of customer claims. 2" Since receiverships are
245
remedial mechanisms generally governed by flexible equitable principles,
their use should not materially diminish pre-existing protections or entitlements of commodity customers and other interested parties conferred by
the CEA or other applicable law. A contrary result would be inequitable
and could undermine the very procedural economies sought to be advanced
by receiverships. If Bankruptcy Code customer protections are not observed
at least in principle when a receivership proceeding is used to distribute the
assets of an insolvent commodity broker, customers thereby disadvantaged,
if fully informed, would presumably seek the protection of the bankruptcy
laws. 246 Moreover, a significant departure from the tenets of the Bankruptcy
Code in this context would enable the form of the proceeding to materially
alter substantive rights, a result disfavored in the law and evidence of
unfairness in practice.
A further reason why the receivership form of the proceeding should
not result in departures from the substantive protections afforded by the
Bankruptcy Code is that those protections essentially derive from and
parallel the treatment of property and customers under the Commodity
Exchange Act. Consequently, to the extent that the Bankruptcy Code is not
honored in receivership proceedings, these CEA precepts nonetheless should
secure an approximately equivalent result for an insolvent firm's customers. 247 For example, the Bankruptcy Code customer priority provides specific
statutory recognition in bankruptcy of customer interests defined by Section
4d(2) of the CEA.24

customers and other creditors. In addition, the greater procedural flexibility of receiverships,
which can accommodate functions ranging from protective custody of customer funds to
liquidation and distribution of a firm's assets under procedures tailored to the case and
modifiable to meet changed circumstances, may render receiverships particularly useful remedies
in conjunction with CFTC enforcement proceedings against firms in apparent violation of the
CFTC's financial regulations or other legal requirements. See generally Teuting & King, Funds
Protection:An Overview of What Happens When a Commodity Broker Becomes Insolvent, 7
J. oF FUTUREs MANRKaErs at 99-101 (Winter, 1987).

244. But see Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985) (avoidance
provisions of Bankruptcy Code do not apply in non-bankruptcy receiverships).
245. 1B J. MooRE, J. LucAs & T. CURRIER, MooRn's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.41912] (2d
ed. 1984).
246. Anqnvoluntary bankruptcy petition may be filed by three creditors having a total of
at least $5000 in unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). Although commodity customers hold
a statutory first priority (subject to certain administrative expense claims), their claims are not
"secured" by customer property in the conventional sense.
247. The Volume receiver's application for withdrawal of the bankruptcy petitions filed
by the Westheimers rested in part upon the contention that disposition of the bankruptcy
petitions would require application of the CEA. See supra note 242.
248. See supra text at 872-876. At least as to matters such as the scope of customer
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Nonetheless, the Volume receivership demonstrated the extent to which
seemingly clear bankruptcy principles might be disputed or even, potentially,
disregarded in receiverships. For example, in the Volume receivership the
view was advanced that the priority claims of the firm's nondefaulting
customers did not extend beyond segregated funds, an anachronistic view
recalling the decision in In the Matter of Weis Securities, which was explicitly
reversed by the Code. 49 To the extent that such basic customer protections
remain open to dispute in receiverships, the protection of commodity
customers affected by commodity broker insolvencies retains the uncertainty
that impelled enactment of the express statutory protections of commodity
250
customers provided by the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
In key respects, however, the Volume receivership eventually achieved
the ultimate objectives of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions for the protection of commodity customers. For the most part, these results were obtained
by compromise and without producing clear judicial precedent to guide
future cases. However, despite the fact that Volume's customers received
full compensation by means of consensual arrangements rather than judicial
enforcement of priority claims, it is reasonable to infer that assessments of
the respective legal rights of the parties shaped the compromises eventually
achieved and that as the governing legal principles are further defined and
clarified, similar controversies can be resolved more expeditiously in the
future.

interests in property entrusted to an FCM, the CEA and the Bankruptcy Code should provide
essentially congruent and overlapping legal standards. The extent to which state law may
provide supplemental rules of decision on matters for which the CEA or Bankruptcy Code
provides no directly relevant rule is less clear. See, e.g., Teuting & King, supra note 243, at
100-01 (noting paucity of authority governing the proper scope of an equity receiver's powers
in the context of an FCM liquidation and that "[m]atters are further complicated by [uncertainty
as to] the extent to which state law will govern the receivership, an issue which is largely
unresolved").
249. In re Weis Securities, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See supra text at 874-876. The extent to which the Volume
receivership proceeding engendered controversies readily resolvable under the Bankruptcy Code
is discussed more fully in Corcoran, Lessons of the Volume Investors Corporation Default,
Eighth Annual ALI-ABA Course of Study on Broker-Dealer Regulation (1986) at 11-13.
250. See supra text at 873-74. The uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Bankruptcy
Code provisions and policies in commodity broker receiverships such as Volume's reflects, as
counsel for Volume's receiver stressed in filings with the receivership court, that the Volume
proceeding was the first "major receivership of a futures commission merchant that was a
member of a commodity clearing organization" since the CFTC's establishment in 1975.
Consequently, the case "presented numerous legal issues for which there is at present no
definitive precedent, including the proper interpretation of the segregation requirements of the
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, the correct application of provisions of the
new Bankruptcy Code, and the new CFTC Regulations thereunder, the correct meaning and
application of [COMEX Clearing's] rules, the proper basis for determining customer equities
in a forced liquidation of a clearing member, and the priorities as among different categories
of claimants." Reply of Receiver's Attorneys to CCA Objections to Fee Applications, CFTC
v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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Priority of Customer Claims. To the extent that Volume's customers

received compensation for the liquidation value of their positions, that result
can be seen as a reflection of the special status of commodity customers
under both the CEA and the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed above, the
"bridge" loan that facilitated a full distribution to Volume's customers

represented an extension of credit conditioned upon the availability to
recompense the COMEX of certain funds owed by the firm's defaulting
customers in settlement of their liability to the receivership. The Code's

customer priority provisions apparently made clear or reinforced basic
equitable assessments that such funds should be subject to the first claim

of Volume's nondefaulting customers and that customer claims preceded
claims of the clearinghouse for the recovery of margin funds advanced to
the other side of the market or of general creditors32'
If assessments of available recoverable customer property were made
promptly and such anticipated recoveries employed as the basis for bridge

loans such as eventually occurred in Volume, distributions to a defaulting
firm's customers could be greatly expedited in many cases. 2 2 The Bankruptcy
Code customer priority provisions and pertinent CEA provisions thus should
facilitate settlements such as that in Volume that recognize the primary

entitlement of customers in a brokerage insolvency to all funds that actually
were or should have been in segregation.
Pro Rata Distributionof Customer Property. In addition to the priority
of customer claims, the Bankruptcy Code generally is intended to assure

customers of equality in the distribution of customer property and to prevent
a race among creditors to recover their funds. The events following Volume's
default raised questions concerning equality of distribution of the firm's
assets which, in the absence of a settlement affording full customer compensation, could have been resolved by reference to the Bankruptcy Code's
pro rata distribution standard.2-3 To the extent that collusive transfers

allegedly were made by Volume or Volume representatives in anticipation
of or immediately following the firm's default by which certain customers

251. Contentions that clearing organization claims for funds advanced as payment of
variation margin on Volume's customer positions constituted customer claims surfaced in the
Volume case but were not litigated. However, the settlement eventually achieved effectively
subordinated such claims to those of Volume's customers. See supra text at 860-62; Reply of
Receiver's Attorneys to CCA Objections to Fee Applications, CFTC v. Volume Investors
Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) at 7, 37-38.
252. Comments by Judge Kevin T. Duffy, who presided over the Volume receivership,
are instructive in this regard. At a May, 1986 hearing on the receiver's fee application, Judge
Duffy recalled that Volume's first receiver, John Peloso, had suggested at the outset of the
proceeding "that perhaps the best thing would be a fast receivership in and out, with [COMEX
Clearing Association] covering the losses for all the public and being assigned all of the claims
that Volume might have. I am quite sure that that solution was suggested by Mr. Peloso to
those in charge. Yet after all of this time, that basically is the solution." CFTC v. Volume
Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (transcript of hearing held on May 29,
1986).
253. See supra text at 876-77.
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attempted to obtain property exceeding their pro rata share of assets
available for distribution, such transfers may have constituted fraudulent
transfers at odds with the fundamentally egalitarian purposes of the Code
and voidable by a bankruptcy trustee. The CFTC's administrative charge
that such transfers violated Section 4b of the CEA, which proscribes fraud
in connection with the making of futures contracts, is further evidence that,
in establishing the reversibility of such transfers, the Bankruptcy Code
advances otherwise applicable policies of the CEA. 2 4 Consequently, had
Volume's customers not been afforded full compensation for their losses,
recovery of such transfers would have been appropriate to protect the
interests of Volume customers whose pro rata distributions were diminished
by such transfers. To facilitate such recovery, the receivership court would
likely have endowed the receiver with avoidance powers patterned after
5
2s
those of a bankruptcy trustee.
Clearing Organization Priority. A third aspect of the Volume episode
with immediate implications for the firm's customers, the actions of COMEX
Clearing, also should be assessed against the relevant provisions and policies
of the Bankruptcy Code. Most controversially, Volume illustrated that, in
practice, the interests of the clearing organization as the principal agency
for preserving the integrity of futures contracts and the stability of the
marketplace256 potentially may conflict with the interests of an insolvent
firm's innocent customers during the highly compressed time frames within

254. See supra text at 857.
255. In Johnson v. Studholme, supra note 244, the court dismissed claims based upon
voidable transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code brought by a receiver to recover certain
distributions made to investors in an alleged Ponzi scheme on the basis that such causes of
action were not available outside of bankruptcy proceedings. Johnson v. Studhohne, 619 F.
Supp. 1347, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985). The court also dismissed claims for the same relief based
upon state law causes of action for money had and received and for unjust enrichment, but
on the ground that it would not be inequitable for the recipients to retain such distributions
rather than the inapplicability of such state law causes of action to the receivership. Id. at
1350. In rejecting the receiver's attempt to employ Bankruptcy Code preference provisions,
Johnson would not appear to address the applicability of federal causes of action in receiverships. For example, it would not appear to address claims under Section 4b of the CEA for
recovery of funds fraudulently transferred, which do not depend upon the distributive provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, which are designed to effect a fair allocation of the debtor's assets
rather than to redress a wrong and which would support a cause of action without regard to
the firm's insolvency or the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The court stressed, for example,
that Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, "a strict liability provision that permits a trustee
to avoid transfers made for less than equivalent value within one year preceding the filing of
bankruptcy," creates a power to be "exercised for the benefit of the creditors of the bankruptcy
estate whose claims are filed and allowed according to other statutory requirements." Id. at
1349. The court concluded that to "extract this authority from the Bankruptcy Act, and apply
it ... for the benefit of any persons to whom distribution may ultimately be ordered in the
receivership, would be such an expansion of the law as to be judicial legislation beyond the
authority of this court." Id. By contrast, recognition of federal causes of action that exist
without regard to the Bankruptcy Code would appear to be not only within the authority of
a receivership court but required in the absence of a countervailing federal statute or policy.
256. See supra text at 865-68.
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which the disposition of a defaulting firm's margin funds and open contracts
is determined. Specifically, the Volume case raised the possibility that a
shortfall in segregated funds could be created in this context without theft
or other affirmative malfeasance by the FCM but through apparently lawful
action of the clearing organization following a customer default. This could
occur, for example, if following a clearing firm's default on a variation
margin call of ten million dollars that principally represents losses on the
positions of one customer who has defaulted on a margin demand issued
by the firm, the clearing organization satisfies the ten million dollar margin
demand by using the firm's total original margin deposits of ten million
dollars, consisting of five million dollars attributable to the defaulting
customer and five million dollars attributable to the firm's nondefaulting
customers. In that event, the segregated funds of nondefaulting customers
are depleted by the clearing organization to effect the payment of variation
margin pursuant to its function as guarantor of the defaulting firm's open
futures positions. As mentioned previously, such an event occurred following
Volume Investor's default when COMEX Clearing applied original margin
deposits of approximately $9.8 million held in segregated accounts on behalf
of Volume's customers collectively toward satisfaction of margin obligations
primarily attributable to the firm's three defaulting customers. In so employing Volume's original customer margin deposits, COMEX Clearing acted
in a manner that appears to be consistent with, although not compelled by,
its by-laws 2 7 and, in the absence of knowledge of or participation in

257. See COMEX Clearing By-Law 9.3 (all cash deposits and collateral deposited by
clearing members as security for the performance of any obligation to the Corporation may
be "applied by the Corporation to any indebtedness or obligation of the defaulting Clearing
Member to the Corporation"). Clearing organization rules and by-laws generally authorize use
of original margin deposits to satisfy obligations of defaulting clearing firms. Such rules range
from broad provisions authorizing the clearing organization to employ all assets of a defaulting
clearing member firm to satisfy the firm's losses to more specific rules that expressly confine
use of customer margin deposits to the satisfaction of obligations arising from the clearing
organization's customer account. Compare Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 802(A) (if
clearing member "fails promptly to discharge any obligation to the Clearing House, its security
deposit ...

,

its margins on deposit with the Clearing House, and any of its other assets

available to the Exchange shall be applied by the Clearing House manager to discharge the
obligations") with CSC Clearing Corporation Rule 302 (if the default is in the customer
account of the clearing member, all of the member's assets under the control of the Clearing
Corporation, whether held for the proprietary or customer account, shall be available to
discharge the obligation; if the default is in the proprietary account, "only that portion of
such assets as are held for the proprietary account shall be available to discharge the
obligation"). Regardless of their precise formulation, however, the operation of such rules is
limited by Section 4d(2) of the CEA so as to preclude the use of customer funds to satisfy a
proprietary obligation of the defaulting firm. See CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3,
Use of Segregated Funds By Clearing Organizations Upon Defaults By Member Firms, supra
note 91. Clearing organization rules and by-laws also commonly provide that the clearing
organization does not assume or incur liability by reason of the obligations of its clearing
firms to their customers. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 803 (liability of the Clearing
House shall be limited to losses resulting from the substitution of the Clearing House upon
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otherwise wrongful conduct, apparently permitted by the CEA and CFTC

regulations.258
The apparent priority of clearing organizations to original margin funds
at the clearing level is justified principally on the policy ground that such

deposits constitute security for the clearing organization's responsibility to
satisfy demands for variation margin owed on the net positions of its
customer, the defaulting firm, and thus to customers on the opposite side

of the defaulting firm's contracts. As the risk of nonperformance on its
member's positions is finally borne by the clearing organization, the clearing
organization constitutes the "ultimate risk-bearer. ' 259 The priority of the

for the discharge of its obligations as
clearing organization to security
' 260
"guarantor of last resort

therefore serves to assure the integrity of

futures transactions, protects clearing firms and the customers of such firms
on the opposite side of the market, and fosters market stability. In this
respect, the first claim against original margin deposits can be said to be

that of overall market stability, a principal objective of the Bankruptcy
Code, while the other primary Code objective, the protection of customers,

is addressed to customers of the marketplace generally and the protection
of customers 261of a specific financially impaired firm is correspondingly
subordinated.

contracts between clearing members; Clearing House shall not be liable for, inter alia,
obligations to a customer by a clearing member); Intermarket Clearing Corporation Rule 404
(liability of the Corporation shall extend only to losses resulting from the nonperformance of
contracts cleared by it and specifically excludes "obligations of a Clearing Member to a
customer or to another Clearing Member"). See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
258. CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3, Use of Segregated Funds Upon Default by
Member Firms, supra note 91; supra text at 865-67.
259.

1 P.

JomsoN, Co

oDrrms

REGULATION

§

2.50 (1982).

260. Id.
261. The clearing organization priority may have a dual character in that it secures the
clearing organization in its role as guarantor of market stability in the event of a clearing firm
default but also mitigates losses to the clearing organization that may arise from conditions
for which the clearing organization, as a self-regulatory body, may in part be responsible.
Indeed, the principal safeguards of market stability are preventive requirements and programs,
for example, minimum financial requirements and margin requirements, for which clearing
organizations and exchanges possess substantial enforcement responsibilities and which are
intended to assure that occasions for assertion of the clearing organization priority do not
arise. See Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note 83, at 50-60. The
financial surveillance programs of clearing organizations and their affiliated exchanges, for
example, are required to entail monitoring of large price movements and assessment of the
impact of such price movements on member firms, responsibilities which the CFTC's staff
concluded were insufficiently discharged in the case of Volume Investors. Volume Investors
Corporation,supra note 20, at 50-51; Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions
supra note 83 at 51-53. See Financial and Segregation Interpretation No. 4-1 (Advisory
Interpretation for Self-Regulatory Organization Surveillance Over Members' Compliance with
Minimal Financial, Segregation, Reporting, and Related Recordkeeping Requirements), Division
of Trading and Markets, CFTC, (July 29, 1985), 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 7114A. The
CFTC staff report on the Volume default notes that the emergency situation created by the
firm's highly concentrated short gold option positions and extreme adverse price movements
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The consequence of a shortfall in an FCM's segregated customer funds,
such as would follow use by a clearing organization of original margin
deposits comprised of segregated funds, coupled with a customer margin

default resulting in an unsecured debit balance, is to place an immediate
obligation upon the firm to restore the fund to its required balance, that
is, to cover its obligations to its customers. 2 2 If the amount of the shortfall
exceeds the FCM's available capital, however, as was true in the case of

Volume Investors, the shortfall in segregated funds is effectively allocated
pro rata among the firm's customers with the likely result that customer
positions will be unsupported by adequate margin. As position transfers

then may be a practical impossibility, a direct consequence of such a shortfall
is likely to be the immediate liquidation of the open positions of the
263
defaulting firm.

In the case of Volume, liquidation of the firm's positions, while not
immediate, followed directly once the full extent of the shortfall in segregated funds created by a customer default exceeding the firm's capital and

on March 18 and March 19 "was worsened by weaknesses in the financial surveillance programs
of COMEX and COMEX Clearing," which "were apparently not aware of the developing
crisis at Volume until most of the damage had already been done. .. ." Volume Investors
Corporation, supra note 20, at 50. As a result of its review of the Volume Investors events,
the CFTC's staff recommended improvements in COMEX and COMEX Clearing financial
surveillance programs, including development of systems to assure better identification of
FCMs carrying high risk positions relative to their capitalization, issuance of intra-day margin
calls for options, and sharing of position data among clearing organizations. Volume Investors
Corporation,supra note 20, at 50-52.
Similarly, one reason for assuming that exchanges will exercise their authority to set margin
requirements at appropriate levels is that since exchange clearing organizations stand as "the
ultimate guarantor of every futures contract," "their own finances would be in jeopardy"
were they to set margins at a level insufficient to cover market risk. SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional
Issues and Oversight-Part1: Hearings on H.R. 5447, H.R. 5515 and H.R. 6156 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance and the Subcomm, on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,- 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 188, 260 (CFTC Submission, May 20, 1982). In its review of the Volume Investors
default, the CFTC's Division of Trading and Markets expressed concern that "weaknesses in
margin policy at the exchange level may have significantly contributed to the Volume default."
Volume Investors Corporation, supra note 20, at 46-49. To the extent that deficiencies in
clearing organization financial surveillance and other self-regulatory programs contribute to a
clearing firm default or fail to prevent or mitigate losses that should have been avoided, the
clearing organization priority, although exercised in behest of the greater good, may permit
"self-help" by an interested, and arguably partially responsible, participant in the financial
crisis.
262. See supra text at 873.
263. See, e.g., Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2500 (transfers "are generally made
only with respect to customer trades which are adequately margined with both the clearing
house and the failing futures commission merchant"); Response of the CFTC to Certain
Written Questions, supra note 83, at 70-71 (CFTC's 1982 assessment of bankruptcies since
Code's effective date indicates that when funds held in segregation for customers are substantially less than the customer claims to such funds, the likelihood of securing willing transferees
for such accounts during the limited time available to effect transfers that are not reversible
by a trustee is small).
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COMEX Clearing's use of original margin deposits deposited in respect of

customers of that firm was comprehended. 26 COMEX Clearing by-laws
provide that upon the termination of the clearing privileges of a member

firm, action required in the event of a failure to satisfy margin obligations
to the clearing organization, all open contracts carried on behalf of such
clearing member must be liquidated by the close of trading on the day
following such termination, except to the extent that such contracts are

transferred to other clearing members. 265 However, if the terminated clearing
member is an FCM, "the corporation shall endeavor to transfer to one or
more other clearing Members the open contracts of customers of such

futures commission merchant in lieu of closing out the same.

....

,,26,

Although the extent of a clearing organization's duty to attempt to effect

transfers of open positions pursuant to such provisions has not been
adjudicated, the improbability that a transferee firm could be located to
accept open positions unsupported by adequate margin funds, a firm com-

mitment to provide such funds, or security for their nonreceipt, would
render such a duty largely unperformable in cases such as Volume. If
positions cannot be transferred, a failure to liquidate them creates the risk
of market losses for the clearing organization, which would be obligated to
fund variation margin payments due to adverse price movements. This
exposure is commonly expected to induce virtually immediate liquidation of
all open positions at the defaulting firm. 267 Ultimately, the defaulting firm's

customers remain at risk if untransferable positions are not liquidated as
price changes, the direction of which cannot be anticipated, can erode the
equity eventually available for distribution. Prompt action to liquidate open

commodity contracts that cannot be transferred is therefore necessary to
26
protect customer as well as market interests.

264. See supra text at 859.
265. COMEX Clearing By-Law 6.1(f).
266. Id.
267. The clearing organization's own potential exposure by reason of its guarantee function
has been recognized to provide such an incentive for liquidation that "[e]ven where the rules
of a particular clearing house merely authorize rather than require liquidation of a defaulting
clearing member's positions, the potential for losses to the clearing house caused by price
movements adverse to such positions will usually dictate immediate liquidation of any positions
which cannot be transferred." T. Russo, supra note 37, § 2.10 at 2-19.
268. The CFTC's staff review of the Volume Investors default reports that although the
firm should have been declared in default or insolvent by COMEX and COMEX Clearing as
of no later than the morning of March 20, 1985, when the firm defaulted on an original
margin call from COMEX Clearing, the bulk of the firm's customer positions on COMEX
were not liquidated until March 22 and March 25. Volume Investors Corporation,supra note
20, at 53. The staff report commented that "by allowing Volume's market exposure in gold
and gold options to remain for several days following the Wednesday morning default, the
Exchange and clearing house left open the possibility that further adverse price movements
could generate newer and bigger losses for the firm and the clearing organization." Id. Why,
in view of such risks, the clearing organization would delay liquidation of positions it had
apparently already determined could not be transferred (see supra text at 858) remains a matter
of debate. The CFTC's staff report commented that "[t]o the extent that COMEX or COMEX

1987]

MARKET STRATEGIES

In employing customer margin deposits to satisfy Volume's margin
obligations, assuming it did not have knowledge of, participate in or aid
unlawful conduct, COMEX Clearing thus acted in a manner consistent with
protection of the overall market, advancing a major Bankruptcy Code
objective and the interests of futures customers generally. However, such
action was not without cost. It caused customers at the insolvent firm in
effect to insure the marketplace against their carrying firm's default, reduced
funds available for distribution and effectively dictated the liquidation of
their open positions. In effect, this action imposed upon Volume's customers
on at least an interim basis losses properly assessable against but not
immediately recoverable from the firm's defaulting customers and, secondarily, from the defaulting firm. 269 To avert that result, COMEX Clearing
would have had to assume such losses itself or shifted them to other market
participants, action that would affect not only its clearing firms on the
opposite side of Volume's open contracts, but also, potentially, the customers of such firms.
The Volume result, however, as we suggest below, may not be compelled
in every case. In the event of a true conflict between the interests of the
relatively small number of customers of a defaulting firm and the stability
of the marketplace, the public interest undoubtedly dictates the compromise
of the interests of a few in favor of protection of the many. This does not,
however, mean that other concerns must be ignored. Measures short of
undermining the security of the market, which may advance the interests
of clearing firm customers as well as those of the clearing organization and
the marketplace as a whole, may exist to respond to a clearing firm default.
In particular, despite the overall consistency of the outcomes achieved in
Volume with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, it is evident that a
central Code policy, the transfer of open positions, was not achieved. This
was so despite the general recognition that such transfers protect both
individual customer interests and the stability of the marketplace and despite
the fact that, depending on the time of intervention, the cost of such
transfers could have been relatively small in the Volume case. 270

IV.

METHODS OF FACIITATING TRANSFERS OF CUSTOMER POSIIONS

From a customer protection perspective, a principal lesson of the Volume
episode may be the simple proposition that in the event of a clearing firm
Clearing officials hoped to limit Volume losses by anticipating that gold prices would recede
from their Tuesday night peaks, they were inappropriately removing their self-regulatory hats
and becoming traders themselves." Id. COMEX Clearing states that it could not commence
liquidation prior to March 22 because it did not know the net open positions in Volume's
account until the close of business on March 21 and that by the close of business on March
22 the unliquidated positions were "basically balanced (i.e., risk free)." COMEX Clearing
Comment, supra note 58, at 6. COMEX Clearing's view that open positions were essentially
balanced means that long futures positions were taken to offset short options positions pending
the liquidation of those options positions.
269. See supra text at 873.
270. See supra text at 860-61.
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default, protection of the many is more readily achievable than protection
of the few. Thus, for customers at the affected firm, compensation over
time based upon liquidation values is far easier to achieve than continuity
of open market positions. To the extent that a clearing organization's
needed use of original margin deposits to meet its obligations to counterparties effectively precludes position transfers, this result reflects the conflict
between market stability, which serves broad-based customer protection
objectives, and customer interests implicated at the immediately affected
firm. 27' However, the failure to effect position transfers also may reflect
the narrow time frame within which transfers typically must be effected, as
little as one day in most cases, 272 and the absence of pre-established procedures to organize and effectuate transfers within such time constraints.
As time is of the essence because of the market risks of open positions, a
failure to have a predetermined course of action to maximize the potential
for transfers is likely to dictate that the opportunity to effect them will be
lost. Moreover, the conclusion that such transfers cannot be achieved when
a segregation short fall exists because no transferee would be likely to
accept undermargined accounts may be self-perpetuating, inasmuch as no
meaningful attempt has yet been made to provide a systematic approach
toward maximizing the potential to achieve such transfers. 273
Claims that position transfers cannot be achieved thus may reflect the
fact that, historically, little attempt has been made to achieve them rather
than the actual impossibility of doing so. If the potential for position
transfers were to be maximized, advance planning would be necessary to
provide an expeditious method of assessing available segregated funds to
margin open customer positions, to identify potential transferees, and to
secure such additional funds or alternate security as may be necessary to
induce the acceptance of such positions by a transferee firm. Such funding
could be obtained by using, for example, established credit facilities of the
clearing organization, 274 clearing organization trust funds275 or clearing organization guarantee funds,2 76 on a temporary basis. As discussed below, to

271. See supra text at 865-68, 896-901.
272. In adopting its bankruptcy regulations, the CFTC stated that it,"would not expect
a clearing organization to wait more than one business day before closing out the open
positions of an insolvent commodity broker" unless the bankruptcy trustee or customers
holding large positions afforded security that variation margin payments would be met." 48
Fed. Reg. 8726 (1983).
273. As noted below, however, position transfers have occurred in isolated cases. See
infra notes 293 and 294.
274. Following the Volume Investors default, COMEX Clearing reportedly initially employed a loan from Chemical Bank to cover some $9 million in variation payments rather
than call upon its guaranty fund. See O'Dea, supra note 79, at 44. COMEX Clearing's guaranty
fund at the time was reported at approximately $80 million, of which approximately 80 per
cent was letters of credit, some of which were unsecured. Volume Investors Corporation,supra
note 20, at 27; Kerwin, supra note 20.
275. See supra note 208.
276. See supra note 207.
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the extent that such advance planning may significantly increase the likelihood of position transfers, substantial economies to the clearing organization
and other market participants as well as significant benefits to commodity
customers may accrue.
A.

CUSTOMER AND MARKET

BENEFITS OF POSITION TRANSFERS

The Bankruptcy Code's commodity broker provisions reflect the conclusion that the preservation of open positions following a clearing firm
default may, in many cases, provide superior benefits to individual commodity customers and to the overall market than the liquidation of such
positions. 277 This assessment is supported by the National Futures Association's recent study of customer account protection which stressed that, in
addition to customer compensation, "[a]nother potentially important goal
of an account protection program would be to provide the ability to
immediately effectuate the orderly transfer of customers' open positions
from an insolvent FCM to a financially stable FCM. ' ' 278 Benefits to customers accrue from position transfers because customer interests in open positions may not be fully recouped by recovery of the liquidation value of
those positions. The liquidation of an open market position may disrupt an
ongoing hedge or other risk-reduction strategy, the essential value of which
lies in th!e continuation of the open futures or option position. 279 NFA's
report observes that the ability of hedgers to maintain their futures or
option positions, and thereby insure against exposure to price movements
adverse to their cash market positions despite a broker's insolvency, would

constitute "a substantial benefit" and that small hedgers as well as many
commercial and institutional customers might prefer to retain their positions
rather than receive even a complete return of margin funds. 2 0 Moreover,
to the extent that the expeditious transfer of positions from an insolvent to
a solvent firm enables business to "proceed as usual" through another
broker, the danger of positions becoming effectively "frozen" pending
liquidation or transfer, with the prospect of substantial interim losses, is
21
diminished.

277. See supra text at 872, 877-78.
278. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 91.
279. As noted above, hedge positions possess "an intangible value separate and apart
from any equity deposited with respect to them which results from their hedging function."
48 Fed. Reg. 8722 (1983); see supra text at 880-81.
280. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 91. In addition to destruction of the
special value of hedge positions or other risk-reduction strategies, forced liquidations may also
disproportionately impair the value of complex, theoretically risk-neutral positions if, as
allegedly occurred following the Volume default, liquidation occurs or liquidation values are
assigned as of different dates without regard to the overall composition of the position. See
supra text at 860.
281. Johnson Statement, supra note 84, at 9-10; Andrews & Sender, Off-Balance Sheet
Risk: Where Is It Leading the Banks?, INsTrrnoNAJ INVESTOR, (January 1986), at 75 (if a
bank's open futures position is frozen, "by the time it could be liquidated or transferred, the
market might have cost the bank hundreds of thousands of dollars").
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In addition, as the framers of the Bankruptcy Code recognized, preservation of open positions enhances the likelihood of continuity of margin
2
payments and thereby increases the stability of the market as a whole.
The NFA's study is in accord, observing that position transfers from
insolvent firms "would also facilitate the continued orderly operation of

the futures markets by eliminating the specter of forced liquidation of
positions. '2 3 Moreover, by increasing the probability that customers will
continue to satisfy margin demands on their open positions, transfers should
diminish the likelihood that the clearing organization will be required to do

so, potentially creating significant economies for the clearing organization in
its role as guarantor.
The events following Volume's default illustrate the potential economic
benefits to customers, the clearing organization, and other market participants from preservation of the open positions of a defaulting clearing firm.

As recounted above, certain Volume customers claimed to have suffered
substantial losses because the liquidation of the firm's positions or the
assignment of liquidation values did not reflect the composition of complex,

putatively risk-neutral positions.2 4 In addition, had positions been transferred rather than liquidated, the clearing organization's liability for varia-

tion margin payments would likely have been significantly reduced by
enabling the firm's nondefaulting customers to continue to fund margin
payments on their own positions.285 Subsequent receivership proceedings and
related litigation also entailed costs for the clearing organization, the exchange, and Volume's customers. Further, the ultimate price of impairment
of public confidence in the futures markets, particularly given the growth
of competing risk-reduction and speculative products sold outside of exchange markets, may be significant. 2 6 The fact that concerns over customer
protection aroused by the Volume default have persisted for months and,
indeed, years after the firm's failure 7 suggests the fragility of public

confidence in markets that lack a systematic method for minimizing the

282. See supra text at 872, 877-78.
283. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 91.
284. See supra text at 860. Losses that flow from a failure to consider the overall
composition of complex positions also could be occasioned in cases where offsetting positions
are maintained in different markets. For example, during the October 1987 market break, the
liquidation of positions in either the securities or futures market could have increased rather
than reduced risk in the other market.
285. As discussed previously, after COMEX Clearing undertook liquidation of Volume's
positions, it made a total of over $9 million in variation margin payments on the firm's open
positions. See supra text at 861.
286. See 52 Fed. Reg. 47022 (1987) ("Regulation of Certain Hybrid and Related Instruments") (CFTC advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning proposed regulatory framework for various commodity-related products sold other than on designated contract markets).
287. E.g., Hiltzig, A Matter of Confidence, Fin. WoLD (Jan. 20, 1987) ("Volume's
collapse demonstrated that the industry's existing 'segregation' rules ... were inadequate to
protect customers from one another" and "that, in times of crisis, exchange and clearinghouse
officials ... could not be relied on to act exclusively in the interest of the marketplace").
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dislocations of a default or insolvency, notwithstanding the relatively low
incidence of customer loss. Had Volume carried accounts for pension plans
or mutual funds, rather than floor traders and a relatively small group of
public customers, it is fair to assume that public confidence would have
been affected even more profoundly.
B.

IMPEDIMENTS TO POSITION TRANSFERS

Despite the evident advantages to affected customers and to the marketplace that may accrue from the transfer of open customer positions, the
events following Volume's default reflected the absence of any established
procedure or institutional mechanism, other than the Bankruptcy Code and
CFTC bankruptcy regulations, to effectuate transfers. As a result, customers, even if willing to supply additional margin funds, apparently were not
afforded an opportunity to effect transfers. The clearing organization and
exchange were equally unable to bring about that result, despite the fact
that the exchange eventually advanced funds in an amount that would have
enabled transfers to occur had such funds been provided at the time of the
default. 281 These results reflect the reality that transfers of positions for
which sufficient margin is lacking are impracticable unless a more formal
procedure is implemented to compensate temporarily for a shortage of
transferable margin funds.
Practically speaking, a transferee firm stands immediately liable to
supply any difference between required margin funds and the funds transferred from the defaulting firm, in addition to satisfying variation margin
demands as they accrue, by drawing upon its own capital. Such funds may
ultimately be recoverable, as occurred in the Volume receivership, through
prosecution of claims against defaulting customers or others answerable for
the deficit. However, the transferee, which may have no interest in accepting
transferred positions other than altruistic loyalty to the exchange, may be
unwilling to assume the risk that recovery of the shortfall will not occur,
commit resources to litigation necessary to effect such recovery, or be
deprived of the use of its own funds pending such recovery. 289 Consequently,
in cases such as Volume where segregated funds are significantly depleted,
the clearing organization or, in the case of a non-member firm, another
SRO, may determine that no likelihood of locating a transferee exists and

288. See supra text at 860-61.
289. Additional obstacles to transfers of open positions may be presented by a transferee
firm's unwillingness to accept accounts of customers it would not otherwise service and the
inadequacy of available records of the insolvent FCM. If the FCM's records do not appear
to be complete or reliable, a transferee may have cause for concern that in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding the bankruptcy trustee or the Commission may be reluctant to approve
transfers of the estimated pro rata share of a customer's equity because of the possibility that
the records may not support an accurate calculation of pro rata distributions or may omit
some customer claims entirely. See Commodity Account Protection, supra note 2, at 58.
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that liquidation therefore must occur. 290 As the CFTC reported in 1978 in
advocating bankruptcy protection of account transfers, "where the amount
of undersegregation has amounted to only a few thousand dollars, some of
the larger futures commission merchants have occasionally accepted a failing
futures commission merchant's customers trades and absorbed any resulting
loss themselves for the 'good of the industry.' ",291 However, no provisions
for mitigating losses associated with the acceptance of such trades existed
and, as a practical matter, it could be "assumed that no futures commission
merchant would be willing to accept such customers' trades where the
292
amount of undersegregation is tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars."
Consequently, although transfers of adequately margined open positions
pursuant to the CFTC's provisions for the transfer of customer accounts
293
of FCMs suffering impaired capital have occurred with some frequency,
transfers from insolvent FCMs or where a significant segregation shortfall
exists have little precedent. 294 To the limited extent that transfers of accounts

290. See supra note 241; Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2500. The improbability of
locating a willing transferee in the absence of a mechanism to restore or otherwise mitigate
the effects of a segregation shortfall was reflected in the CFTC's review in 1981 of the
bankruptcies of several non-member FCMs that had occurred following the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Commission reported that by the time of the relevant bankruptcy
filings, the segregated funds held for each firm's customers were substantially less than the
customer claims to such funds, with shortfalls ranging from 2 to 3.8 million. The CFTC stated
that "[a]lthough additional money was recovered by the trustee for the benefit of customers
subsequent to the bankruptcy filing, it is easy to see why there were no willing transferees
during the few days transfers which are not reversible by a trustee could have been made."
The CFTC contrasted the problems created in these cases by undersegregation with the "Silver
Crisis" events of 1979-80, when the solvency of a COMEX Clearing member was jeopardized
but, because its segregated funds were not impaired, "a transfer of open customer positions
might have been possible." Response of the CFTC to Certain Written Questions, supra note
83, at 70-71.
291. Bagley Testimony, supra note 28, at 2500-01.
292. Id.
293. As discussed above, the CFTC's regulations require the transfer of customer accounts
carried by an FCM in violation of the minimum capital requirement of CFTC Regulation
1.17(a). See supra text 883-85. Such transfers have occurred in a number of cases. In the case
of two firms, Maduff & Sons and First LaSalle, Inc., such transfers were effected, although
neither firm was technically in violation of applicable financial requirements, based upon
business decisions reached by the firm and the relevant exchange. In the case of a third firm,
ContiCommodity Services, Inc., the firm's capital impairment was remedied by an infusion of
funds from its parent, Continental Grain, which enabled the firm to continue in operation.
An exchange-supervised transfer of accounts was nonetheless agreed upon and effected. In
these cases, there was no apparent shortfall in customer segregated funds available to margin
open customer positions. Commodity Account Protection, supra note 2, at 12-13, 55.
294. In November, 1986, some one hundred customer accounts, representing nearly $2
million in equity including open positions, at Paris Securities Corporation ("Paris"), a New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) clearing member which apparently suffered from impairment of capital below the required minimum as well as a shortage of segregated funds,
were transferred under the supervision of the exchange. Although Paris' principals agreed to
supply the funds necessary to restore the deficiency in segregated customer funds prior to the
transfer, the transfer was facilitated by NYMEX actions to assure the- transferee firm,
Geldermann Incorporated, against the risks of accepting the transferred accounts, including a
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unsupported by sufficient segregated funds have occurred, they have de-

pended, in the absence of an institutional framework or procedure, upon
ad hoc, negotiated arrangements with interested parties to secure additional

funds to permit transfers. Such measures, while available to the initiated,
do not afford either commodity customers or the marketplace generally a
realistic option for preserving the continuity of positions. Moreover, in the
absence of clearly defined procedures, even in the rare instances in which
transfers are effected, the potential for unfair results and costly controversies
29s

concerning the mechanics and valuation of transfers may be created.
Flexible procedures established in advance which would provide immediate
access to a source of funds to cover shortfalls in a failed firm's segregated

customer account are apparently necessary if the statutory expectation that
open positions can be transferable in such cases296 is to be meaningfully
fulfilled.
C.

POTENTIAL METHODS

OF FACILITATING TRANSFERS

In constructing procedures to facilitate both individual and bulk position
transfers, the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations, while not directly applicable

NYMEX Board of Director's resolution stating the exchange's guarantee to all Paris customers
of "the full and prompt payment of any deficiency" in the equity required to be on deposit
in each such customer's account and a NYMEX guarantee to Geldermann that in the event
of a failure by Paris "to transfer [customer] positions with full, lawfully required positions
and equities computed as of the close of business on November 11, 1986," it would make
"full and prompt payment of the difference between the value of the transferred accounts"
and their equities computed as of November 11, 1986. See Siconolfi & Sullivan, Clearing Firm
Closes Amid Accusations It MisappropriatedFunds of Customers, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1986
at 6, col. 4.
295. For example, in In re Incomco, No. 80-B-11217 (Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1984), a
bankruptcy which was instituted following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code's commodity
liquidation provisions but prior to the promulgation of the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations,
Heritage Commodity Consultants Inc., a registered commodity pool operator and trading
advisor, was given the option, pursuant to court approval, of liquidating or transferring its
positions. Heritage elected to transfer its open futures contracts to another FCM and those
positions were so transferred several days after the bankruptcy filing with 20 percent of the
applicable equity, representing an estimate of the firm's pro rata share of funds available for
distribution. Heritage subsequently submitted a claim for the depreciation in the value of its
open contracts between the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition and the transfer of those
positions. This claim conflicted with the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that a customer's
"net equity" with respect to positions that the customer elects to transfer be determined by
valuing such positions "as of the date of the transfer", 11 U.S.C. § 761(17)(c) (1982), as well
as with the more specific requirement of the CFTC's regulations that the net equity of
customers who elect to hold their positions open following filing of the petition must be
adjusted by crediting or debiting their accounts for losses or gains accrued after the filing
date. 17 C.F.R. § 190.07(b)(6) (1987). Although the CFTC argued that Heritage's claim should
be rejected as contrary to express Code provisions and as an attempt to shift the risk of
voluntarily assumed trading losses to the firm's other customers, the court approved a
compromise of Heritage's claims, apparently to avoid potentially costly litigation at the estate's
expense. See Opposition of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Application of
the Trustee for Order Approving Compromise of Claims, In re Incomco, Inc., 80-B-11217
(Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1984).
296. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 106-07 (1978).
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outside of bankruptcy proceedings, suggest that the potential for effecting
transfers may yet to be fully explored in other contexts. For example, these
regulations suggest that procedures to permit infusions of additional funds
by individual customers as necessary to assure that such transfers do not
result in a greater than pro rata distribution can be created to facilitate
position transfers on a systematic basis. 297 Although the CFTC's bankruptcy
regulations do not govern when a bankruptcy petition has not been filed, 298
they may serve as a model on which other approaches, including voluntary
measures by self-regulatory organizations to provide relief to customers
directly affected by a default, might be fashioned. Such measures could
parallel or expand upon the CFTC's regulations with respect to hedge
accounts, 299 employing customer account agreements that would simplify
transfer issues by allowing account holders to specify when opening their
accounts whether they wished to have their accounts liquidated in the event
of the suspension from trading of a carrying firm, insolvency, or a bankruptcy filing. Similarly, also drawing upon the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations, in such cases contingency plans could be made for notifying customers
that liquidation of open positions would ensue if an election to transfer
and a statement of willingness to supply additional funds as needed to make
up any shortfall between the customer's pro rata share of customer property
and funds sufficient to permit transfer were not received within a specified
period. At a minimum, such procedures could be established for hedge
positions, or for particular types of customers, achieving parity outside of
bankruptcy proceedings with the transfer opportunity afforded by the CFTC's
bankruptcy regulations.
Although the creation of procedures to facilitate preservation of hedge
positions may satisfy the clearest need for position transfers, procedures
that entail customer-by-customer notice, election to transfer or liquidate,
and calculation of pro rata distributive shares may impose upon a clearing
organization or other intermediary impracticable administrative burdens.
Moreover, while helpful in avoiding the likely disorganization attendant

297. In the wake of the Volume failure, notably, even customers who allegedly were
ready, willing and able to supply additional margin funds to obtain a transfer of their positions
were unable to do so, while others sought to preserve their assets from the debacle through
questionable self-help techniques and the "race to the till" which bankruptcy law was intended
to prevent. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)2-4 (1982), defining a trustee's right to avoid as
preferences certain transfers made within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing (or, if made
to insiders, within a year prior to the filing) for or on account of an antecedent debt and
while the debtor was insolvent that enable the creditor to receive a greater percentage of his
claim than he would receive in a bankruptcy distribution. Id.
298. The absence of procedures, such as those provided under the CFTC's bankruptcy
regulations, to provide hedgers the opportunity to preserve open positions to facilitate transfers
outside of bankruptcy, creates a disparity in position protection that, to the extent generally
understood, would increase the likelihood that customers with large hedge positions and
knowledge of a failing firm's financial condition would elect to place the firm in bankruptcy
to protect their open positions.
299. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(d)(1)-(2) (1987); see supra text at 880-83.
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upon a financial emergency and the consequent preference for the swift and
the easy, such procedures would fall short of assuring the routine continuity
of open positions and margin payments that a mechanism for the transfer
of all customer positions would afford. A pre-existing or even merely preidentified source of funds to replenish shortfalls in segregated funds, together
with an institutional procedure of general application to effectuate transfers,
could expedite transfers and thereby minimize the market risks of open
positions, reduce the liability of the clearing organization to make variation
margin payments, and limit the potential for inequitable self-help measures.
Indeed, an established source of funds to facilitate transfers and a systematic
procedure for effectuating them could significantly enhance the ability of
bankruptcy trustees to fulfill existing Bankruptcy Code and CFTC bankruptcy transfer policies by affording security to the clearing organization
that transfers can be achieved and that the exercise of contractual liquidation
nor desirable, notwithstanding the
authority is therefore neither inevitable
3
exercise of the clearing priority. 0
The key to such a transfer program, as the NFA's study stressed, would
be the immediate availability of funds sufficient to margin positions to be
transferred. 0' NFA's study estimated that approximately $2.4 million would
be required on an annual basis to provide for the transfer of positions from
failed firms. 02 NFA's review of the historical record of FCM insolvencies
also reflected, however, that as much as one-half of the average shortfall
in segregated funds is eventually recovered and thus that "the annual drain
would likely be "somewhat less"
on the resources of a transfer mechanism"
303
than the estimated 2.4 million dollars.
Even based upon NFA's calculations, which address the estimated fund
required to restore segregated funds to the amount necessary to satisfy
customer equity claims in full, it appears that a modest fund would be
sufficient to permit transfers of positions in most cases. NFA apparently
calculated an amount sufficient to restore funds sufficient to satisfy customer
claims in full. However, a funding mechanism designed to supply a temporary extension of credit to facilitate transfers rather than providing
permanent compensation to clearing firm customers could be structured.
Using this approach, the total funds required to replenish the shortfall in

300. See 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1982); supra text at 896-901.
301. See supra text at 905-07.
302. This figure is based upon NFA's calculation of average maintenance margin requirements for FCMs, as of September 30, 1985, of approximately $9.5 million. NFA's review of
failed FCMs reflected that such firms typically have held considerably less customer funds
than the average FCM. Based upon a conservative analysis of the historical record of FCM
insolvencies, NFA assumed for the purposes of its calculations that the average failed firm
has a margin requirement of one-half of the $9.5 million average and that the shortfall in
segregated funds would amount to less than 500 of the funds required to be in segregation.
Based upon these conservative assumptions, NFA estimated that approximately $2.4 million
would be required to be readily available on an annual basis to fund the transfer of positions
from failed FCMs. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 42-46.
303. Id. at 43, 46.
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segregated funds would be measured by the prevailing rate of interest
multiplied by the period required to recover collectible obligations to the
debtor's estate, an amount which could be significantly less than that
estimated by NFA as necessary to establish and to secure a transfer program.
Such a mechanism would recognize that, while open positions can be
maintained only if supported by immediately available funds, subsequent
recovery of funds from defaulting customers, the firm itself, or others
responsible for the segregation deficit may substantially restore the initial
shortfall in segregated funds. Such a program would depart from previous
conceptions of customer account insurance by stressing short-term availability of funds to facilitate transfers rather than commodity account insurance or a compensation fund to shift losses permanently from a defaulting
firm's customers to other market participants or the industry as a whole.
If a mechanism based upon an extension of credit to bridge the gap
between eventual recovery of equity in a receivership or bankruptcy proceeding and funds immediately necessary to supply transferable margin were
established, th clearing organization and/or exchange could draw upon a
number of alternative sources. For example, the clearing organization or
exchange could draw from guarantee funds, trust funds, surplus operating
funds, or credit lines to supply the difference between available segregated
funds and the total margin immediately required to transfer positions to
solvent firms. To the extent funds advanced to effect transfers constituted
borrowings, the clearing organization and/or exchange supplying such funds
should be subrogated to the rights of the defaulting firm and its customers
to distributions in a subsequent receivership or bankruptcy distribution. In
cases in which such recoveries did not equal the amount of credit extended
to facilitate transfers plus interest, customers receiving the benefits of the
transfer could be called upon to pay their pro rata share of the shortfall. 304
In effect, the exchange or clearing organization would assume the distributive
and recoupment authority of a bankruptcy trustee, a function that could
be clarified by the adoption of appropriate clearing organization and exchange rules and implemented by specific provisions in customer agreements.
Such a procedure would result in shifting the initial impact of a
segregation shortfall, by consent of the parties, to the clearing organization
or exchange rather than the customers of the defaulting firm, with potential
benefits extending far beyond those customers' ability to maintain their
positions and accruing to the market as a whole. However, a procedure

304. This proposal would also contemplate that to the extent that holders of transferred
accounts received distributions in excess of their pro rata share of the assets eventually available
for distribution, they would be required to refund the excess distribution. This would eliminate
the concerns expressed in NFA's report that infusion of funds to permit transfers would not
result in pro rata transfers. National Futures Association, supra note 2, at 92. Moreover, the
Code permits transfers which do not result in strict pro ration if accomplished prior to five
days after the bankruptcy order of relief and approved by the CFTC. 11 U.S.C. § 764(b)
(1984). See supra text at 878. Transfers would not be expected to occur where the FCM's
records are so materially deficient that even approximate calculations of pro rata distributions
cannot be made.
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that entails the use of exchange or clearing organization funds to supply a
source of margin would contemplate that the relevant clearing organization
assess its ability to guarantee market integrity without the use of resources
earmarked as a temporary source of funding for transfers. This would
assure that such transfers could generate the customer and market benefits
discussed previously without impairing the clearing organization's ability to
assure market stability. Had the clearing organization facilitated transfers
of Volume customer positions by forbearing the use of original margin
deposits as security for the firm's variation margin obligations in favor of
eventual recovery in the receivership distribution, it voluntarily would have
achieved the effects outlined above.
A critical premise of any such transfer program would be the availability
of sufficient resources to assure the clearing organization's ability to continue
to guarantee payment of variation margin to the opposite side of the market
on open positions of the defaulting firm prior to a transfer. However, since
clearing organization guarantee funds in fact exist for the purpose of
securing the payment of variation margin, the extent to which such funds
also could facilitate funding of a modest pre-approved transfer program
without jeopardizing the integrity of the market should be explored. It is
possible that if such guarantee funds were employed directly to fund
transfers, or indirectly to facilitate transfers by supporting an extension of
credit, they could substantially advance the purposes for which they exist
by reducing the exposure of clearing organizations to demands for variation
margin that could be expected to be satisfied by customers if their positions
were transferred to solvent firms. Consequently, the benefits of such a
program for clearing organizations could exceed its costs, even without
regard to the salutary effects of transfers upon affected customers and the
overall marketplace.
A transfer program of the nature proposed here would, of necessity,
entail discretionary action by a clearing organization or exchange. If the
shortfall in available segregated funds exceeded or even approached the
resources designated to fund transfers, the clearing organization or exchange
could reasonably be expected to forego transfers rather than incur the risk
of nonrecovery of overpayments due to poor or incomplete records or
disputes over account valuations. Moreover, even if resources sufficient to
fund transfers were available but the failed FCM's records were deficient,
court approval might be considered necessary to afford protection against
subsequent recalculations and attendant customer claims.
In addition to allowing the exercise of discretion on the part of the
exchange or clearing organization to determine the feasibility of transfers
on a case-by-case basis,*a program for the transfer of positions could entail
significant administrative burdens that substantially replicate those assumed
by a bankruptcy trustee or non-bankruptcy receiver. For example, a method
to safeguard the firm's assets against dissipation pending the transfer of its
funds and positions could be important. 05 In addition, computation of
305. The collusive transfers alleged to have occurred on March 20, 1985 when the Volume
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available segregated funds and of the balance necessary to be covered to
permit transfers would necessitate access to the failed firm's books and
records3 and, potentially, the assistance of firm employees and access to
its computer systems. These tasks would require the prompt availability of
exchange or clearing personnel, the cooperation of the firm itself or recourse
to the courts, and an advance of expenses by the clearing organization or
exchange that eventually would have to be taxed against any existing
compensation fund.c 7
For these practical and legal reasons, existing procedures under the
CFTC's bankruptcy regulations or court-appointed receiverships such as
that employed in Volume may provide the most practical framework in
which to administer a pre-established exchange or clearing organization
transfer fund if the transfer occurs after an actual default and there is a
shortfall in segregated funds. Such an approach would provide the protections of the court, retain the administrative assistance of the SRO, and tap
the resources of a receiver or trustee, while substantially increasing the
likelihood of transfers by affording a basis for deferral by clearing organizations of their contractual authority to liquidate open positions and an
established, although limited, fund to permit transfers.
Ultimately, of course, the best protection against the dislocations of an
FCM's insolvency is prevention of the insolvency and the most expedient
and economical method of effecting transfers of open positions despite an
insolvency is to prevent shortfalls in segregated funds, through insufficient
capital or otherwise, that create the necessity for extraordinary efforts to
secure additional margin funds to facilitate transfers. An institutional framework to facilitate position transfers such as that outlined above would
constitute a substantial self-regulatory response to customer and market
protection problems that ensue when measures to prevent impairment of
FCM capital and depletion of segregated funds have failed. Such a remedial
mechanism should be advanced, however, with a recognition that a formal
transfer program is necessary only to the extent that existing regulatory and
self-regulatory safeguards have not fully achieved their objective. Indeed,
Volume's default and concomitant disruptions have been attributed at least
in part to weaknesses in relevant SRO financial surveillance and other selfregulatory programs. 3 8 In this regard, the pre-bankruptcy account transfers

default was imminent or had occurred and prior to appointment of a receiver for the firm on
March 21, 1985, suggest the necessity for such protective measures. See supra text at 857.
306. Exchanges and clearing organizations should have access to clearing members' books
and records in the ordinary course of business in order to fulfill their responsibilities to enforce
minimum financial requirements and other rules applicable to their members. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 1.51-52 (1987). Potentially, both entities would need to cooperate in the event of a transfer.
307. The NFA, as an industry-wide, self-regulatory organization which discharges a variety
of audit and oversight functions and maintains a staff of qualified auditors, could potentially
provide a source of interim staff assistance to discharge the administrative and audit functions
necessary to effectuate transfers.
308. See supra note 261.
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that have been effected pursuant to CFTC Regulation 1.17(a)(4)0 9 can be
viewed as instances in which bankruptcy dislocations and Volume-like
controversies over competing clearing system and customer demands were
avoided by self-regulatory and regulatory actions to achieve consensual
transfers based upon effective financial surveillance prior to an actual
insolvency or depletion of segregated funds.
Consequently, any concerted effort to improve the industry's selfregulatory response to FCM insolvencies should first assure the efficacy of
existing self-regulatory programs of a preventive nature. In this connection,
the relative economy and simplicity of transfers pursuant to Regulation
1. 17(a)(4) suggest that such transfers should be preferred to later intervention
and should be viewed as a key adjunct to self-regulatory financial surveillance programs to identify FCMs that may be in jeopardy of significant
capital impairment. If employed as prophylactic measures before any significant capital impairment actually occurs and, thus, prior to any depletion
of segregated funds, such pre-bankruptcy transfers may frequently obviate
crisis situations in which the integrity of the futures positions of a failing
firm's customers or of the firm's obligations to the clearing system and the
marketplace as a whole are directly threatened. 10
CONCLUSION

The futures industry has a record of remarkably few insolvencies and
low customer losses. As a consequence, establishment of a governmentsponsored insurance fund has been found unwarranted for the futures
markets, whereas the significantly greater frequency of securities broker/
dealer insolvencies and higher securities customer losses have been addressed
by legislation creating a customer insurance system subject to federal oversight. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the potential exists for substantial
dislocation, of at least a temporary nature, in the event of a futures firm
failure.
Nearly three years after the event and despite full reimbursement of the
firm's customers, the Volume episode lives on in the public mind as a lesson
in the potential consequences of a futures broker failure. That case reflected
that even full compliance with the Commodity Exchange Act's stringent
segregation requirements could not assure the firm's customers against loss
and that once such losses had occurred, no formal governmental or selfregulatory program was in place to restore such losses. Moreover, the
positions of the firm's customers were liquidated without any serious attempt
to transfer them, reflecting the current absence of any mechanism to
replenish available segregated funds to provide margin sufficient to permit
transfers. Most importantly, however, the stability of the market remained
undisrupted throughout, the clearing organization stepped forward to pay

309. See supra note 293.
310. See supra text at 883-84.
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the counterparties opposite Volume for the losses accrued on its positions,
and nearly one year after the firm's default, Volume's nondefaulting customers received full reimbursement. Thus, while FCM failures are rare,
cases such as Volume illustrate potential hardships that could be ameliorated
through a more systematic approach to position transfers than is afforded by
current regulatory and self-regulatory programs. Existing regulatory and selfregulatory frameworks, which provide a basis for assuring customer recovery
of account equity subject to pro rata allocation of losses and for safeguarding
overall market stability against the impact of a firm failure.
The Bankruptcy Code's commodity broker liquidation provisions advance two paramount objectives, customer protection and market stability.
These objectives are reflected in specific statutory provisions that should
assure customers fundamental fairness in the event of a commodity broker's
insolvency and prevent "domino" effects that could jeopardize the solvency
of other market participants. The Code's legislative history also reflects
Congress' intention to foster a third objective, the transfer of open commodity positions from insolvent to solvent commodity brokers, which could
provide a means for advancing and harmonizing the statute's overriding
customer and market protection purposes.
Unlike the protection of customer and market interests, however, the
intent of the Bankruptcy Code's framers to foster position transfers could
not be effectuated through enactment of statutory provisions, such as the
customer priority, proscriptions against the reversal of pre-bankruptcy margin payments, or preclusion against interference with contractual liquidation
rights, that achieve their statutory purposes by mandating particular actions
or precluding others. Rather, as the Code's framers recognized, position
transfers could be protected against avoidance by a bankruptcy trustee and
encouraged as a matter of policy, but could not be required in all cases.
Indeed, no regulatory framework that does not supply a source of funds
to restore full margin to positions that have become undermargined could
guarantee that such transfers would occur. However, to enable holders of
properly identified hedge positions to preserve their positions despite a
broker's insolvency, the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations provide a detailed
procedure that permits individual position holders to supply such additional
funds as may be necessary to preserve their positions and an administrative
framework for organizing transfer efforts. Although the logistical burdens
entailed in effecting even this limited category of transfers may appear
onerous, the CFTC's hedge transfer procedures constitute the only method
yet envisioned, much less established, to respond to the otherwise generally
preclusive effect of segregation shortfalls upon position transfers. Although
position transfers have occurred in isolated cases even when a shortage of
segregated funds existed, such events have been extremely rare and have
depended upon ad hoc, negotiated arrangements that afford no general
assurance that transfers of even hedge positions will occur. Moreover, to
the extent that the CFTC's bankruptcy regulations provide hedgers with a
means of maintaining their positions in the event of an insolvency, they
cannot assure that result even for hedgers except in the limited category of
cases in which an insolvent broker is placed in bankruptcy.
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Historically, concerns that the futures industry fails to afford sufficient
security to its customers, in the absence of account insurance or other
customer compensation mechanisms, have been answered by reference to
the industry record of relatively infrequent insolvencies and low customer
losses, an impressive record improved in significant measure by the past
willingness of commodity exchanges to afford customers compensation on
a voluntary basis. Public debate on such issues, however, has failed until
recently to address the importance of preserving open futures and options
positions, as opposed to funding customer reimbursement, or to explore the
relative costs and benefits of a customer protection program designed
exclusively to preserve the continuity of open positions. Potentially significant benefits to the self-regulators as well as to commodity customers from
a systematic procedure for effecting position transfers therefore have been
ignored. Recent studies suggest, however, as the Code's framers recognized,
that maintaining open positions may afford substantial benefits to commodity customers as well as to the market as a whole and that position
transfers are an important protection of the hedging function of the futures
markets.
Viewed against the potential benefits of preserving open positions of an
insolvent broker, the industry's historically low customer losses may be
more probative of the practicability of a program to facilitate transfers than
of the acceptability of the status quo. Consequently, although no inflexible
procedure or unlimited source of funds that will ensure the transfer of
positions in every case can reasonably be contemplated, we suggest that a
modicum of advance planning and a modest credit facility or other source
of funds could increase significantly the likelihood of effecting transfers in
many insolvencies. Such a program could prove to be substantially selffunding over time in that recoveries in the course of receivership or bankruptcy proceedings may significantly restore initial outlays to effect transfers
and expeditious transfers potentially could secure significant reductions in
clearing organization guarantee obligations. In addition, such a program
would afford the self-regulators and commodity customers increased certainty and security, reduce the potential for costly and disruptive litigation,
enhance the hedging function of the futures markets, and provide a firm
foundation for public confidence in the futures industry's ability to respond
to a broker insolvency in a manner that evenhandedly advances the interests
of commodity customers and of the marketplace as a whole.
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